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Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) is a policy where employees use their own personal
mobile devices to perform work-related tasks. Enterprises reduce their costs since they
do not have to purchase and provide support for the mobile devices. BYOD increases
job satisfaction and productivity in the employees, as they can choose which device
to use and do not need to carry two or more devices.
However, BYOD policies create an insecure environment, as the corporate net-
work is extended and it becomes harder to protect it from attacks. In this scenario,
the corporate information can be leaked, personal and corporate spaces are not sep-
arated, it becomes difficult to enforce security policies on the devices, and employees
are worried about their privacy. Consequently, a secure BYOD environment must
achieve the following goals: space isolation, corporate data protection, security policy
enforcement, true space isolation, non-intrusiveness, and low resource consumption.
We found that none of the currently available solutions achieve all of these goals.
We developed Remote Mobile Screen (RMS), a framework that meets all the goals
for a secure BYOD environment. To achieve this, the enterprise provides the employee
with a Virtual Machine (VM) running a mobile operating system, which is located in
the enterprise network and to which the employee connects using the mobile device.
We provide an implementation of RMS using commonly available software for an x86
architecture.
We address RMS challenges related to compatibility, scalability and latency. For
the first challenge, we show that at least 90.2% of the productivity applications from
Google Play can be installed on an x86 architecture, while at least 80.4% run normally.
For the second challenge, we deployed our implementation on a high-performance
server and run up to 596 VMs using 256 GB of RAM. Further, we show that the
number of VMs is proportional to the available RAM. For the third challenge, we
used our implementation on GENI and conclude that an application latency of 150
milliseconds can be achieved.
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Introduction
Mobile devices have become integral elements in our daily life, and they have become
ubiquitous. For example, in 2013, the adoption of mobile devices and connections
grew to 7 billion units, according to a report from Cisco [1]. To put this figure into
perspective, according to the United Nations there are 7.2 billion inhabitants in the
world [2].
Mobile devices have had a tremendous impact on companies, since they increase
the productivity of the employees, as well as provide flexibility in terms of time and
space. Consequently, companies have been providing their employees with mobile
devices to enable them to perform their job-related tasks. However, the extensive
use of these devices has created inconveniences for enterprises since they must handle
the costs associated with obtaining and maintaining such devices. Additionally, the
incredible speed in which new technologies are introduced make the current models
of these devices less appealing to the employees after a short period of time. This
results in situations where employees want to change their devices faster than the
enterprises can provide them with new ones.
As a result of this choice and customization in mobile devices, employees often
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Figure 1.1: Representation of a BYOD environment.
request their companies to allow them to use their personal mobile devices for work-
related tasks while also retaining them for personal use [3]. Because of this merging
of usage, these devices are known as dual-use devices [4].
1.1 Description of BYOD
In these environments, companies have adopted solutions in the form of new policies.
This set of policies is known as Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), which allows an
employee to use the mobile devices they prefer to perform work-related tasks. In a
recent study carried out by Cisco, it was found that 89% of IT departments enable
BYOD in some form [5]. A typical BYOD environment is depicted in Figure 1.1,
where an employee uses a personal smartphone and a personal tablet not only for
personal activities but also for work-related tasks.
BYOD provides a series of advantages for both employees and the enterprise,
which are described below:
31.1.1 Job Satisfaction
The use of BYOD policies produces an increase in job satisfaction in the employees.
As mentioned before, employees can select the device they feel comfortable with and
replace it at the time of their choosing. They also avoid carrying additional devices
by using a single device for both personal and work uses. A Cisco report [5] mentions
that the main reasons for employees to use personal devices in a BYOD scenario are
the “any device work style”, the possibility of combining work and personal activities,
the avoidance of usage restrictions, the “consumer experience” at work, and the access
to personal mobile applications.
1.1.2 Productivity
After applying BYOD policies, companies have seen an increase in productivity in
terms of output as well as an increment in collaboration among employees. According
to Cisco [5], this is the most important finding in their research, since it shows that the
use of personal devices in the BYOD environment does not result in distractions, but
it has the opposite effect. Further, Assing et al. [6] mentioned that staff productivity
is increased by the fact that mobility allows the employees to be productive from
anywhere.
1.1.3 Recruitment
Loose et al. [7] showed that there is a highly significant correlation between how
attractive an enterprise is to a future employee and the adoption of BYOD by that
enterprise. Hayes [8] supports this concept by showing that a company that applies
BYOD policies is more appealing to potential employees, as the enterprise is seen as
a flexible work environment.
41.1.4 Cost Saving
Assing et al. [6] state that BYOD has its origins in the fact that companies wanted
to reduce costs of equipment available to employees by letting them purchase the
mobile devices they desire. Additionally, enterprises do not have to incur in expenses
related to providing technical support for such devices. Moreover, technical support
resources can be either focused on a better service, allocated to other area of the
enterprise, or simply reduced.
1.2 Contribution
This thesis addresses the following question:
Can a BYOD solution be implemented in such a way that it provides security to
the corporate data as well as privacy to the employee?
In order to answer this question, this work provides the following contributions:
• In order to achieve a secure BYOD environment, we extend the goals previously
found in literature by including true space isolation, non-intrusiveness and low
resource consumption.
• We provide a comprehensive survey of all the solutions for BYOD environments
and we describe why they do not achieve all the goals needed for a secure BYOD
environment.
• We provide a framework that meets all the required goals for a secure BYOD
environment. We provide a proof-of-concept and evaluate our solution.
5These contributions are part of the paper “Remote Mobile Screen (RMS): an ap-
proach for secure BYOD environments” [9] presented at the International Conference
on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC) 2015, technically sponsored
by IEEE, and of a survey paper submitted to a journal [10]. Finally, a paper related
to the implementation challenges of RMS is under review [11].
1.3 Outline of Thesis
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a background
on security related to mobile devices, the challenges to provide a secure BYOD en-
vironment and the goals that must be met in order to overcome these challenges.
In Chapter 3 we provide a comprehensive classification and description of the cur-
rent solutions for secure BYOD environments, either commercial solutions or from
the research community. We analyze these solutions and show that none of them
achieve all the necessary goals. Remote Mobile Screen (RMS) and its architecture
is presented in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we analyze the features offered by RMS,
we show an implementation of this framework, we discuss the challenges presented
by this solution, and we show the results of evaluations related to scalability and la-
tency. In Chapter 5 we provide the conclusion of this thesis, as well as future research
directions for this work. Appendix A presents the list and description of the mobile
applications evaluated in our usability test. In Appendix B we provide the scripts
used for our scalability evaluation. Finally, the scripts used for our latency evaluation
are provided in Appendix C.
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Background
As described in Chapter 1, BYOD policies present great benefits for both the enter-
prise and the employee. However, the implementation of these policies creates threats
related to the corporate information and the privacy of the employee. In this Chapter
we present the threats on mobile devices, we show that these threats create challenges
for a secure BYOD environment, and we describe a set of goals that must be met to
overcome these challenges.
2.1 Threats on Mobile Devices
These types of threats focus on exploiting vulnerabilities found in the architecture of
the mobile device. These attacks are generally in the form of malware or vulnerabili-
ties of the communication capabilities. Consequently, we present the flow of an attack
on mobile devices, a description and classification of malware, and the vulnerabilities
found in the communication sub-layer.
72.1.1 Flow of Attacks on Mobile Devices
Wang et al. [12] describe how an attack is performed on mobile devices. It starts
by the attacker exploiting a vulnerability through an attack vector, which generally
targets the application layer, then the attack goes through the communication layer
to reach the resource layer. Then, the flow of the attack goes all the way back through
the layers to a premium account or malicious website. Finally, a loop is formed when
the flow of the attack reaches back the attacker. Figure 2.1 shows the process involved
in an attack on a mobile device.
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Figure 2.1: Flow of a malware attack on mobile devices (based on [12]).
2.1.2 Mobile Malware and Potential Unwanted Applications
(PUA)
Mobile malware and PUA are the main concerns in mobile devices. According to a
report from F-Secure Corporation [13], malware is software whose objective is to pose
security risks that affect the user’s information or system. Malware is classified into
the following categories:
• Backdoor: it is a program that allows unauthorized access to information by
avoiding authentication mechanisms; in the case of mobile devices, this unau-
thorized access is remote.
8• Trojan Horse: it is an application that pretends to be benign but whose real
objective is to affect negatively the user’s system and data.
• Worm: it is software whose goal is to produce an exact replication of itself.
A PUA is a piece of software that can be considered unwanted or intrusive by
the user, and that introduces privacy or security risks. If the user knows about such
risks, he or she can accept them and decide to install the application. The different
types of PUAs are listed below:
• Spyware: it is an application that obtains information about the user’s system
and behavior and then stores that information for future analysis by an attacker.
• Trackware: it is a program that collects data that can be used to identify and
locate the user or the device by a third party.
• Adware: it is an application that shows advertisement information in an unso-
licited way or that might expose the user to privacy or security risks.
The main problem with malware in BYOD environments is that mobile devices
might spread out these malware over the corporate network, infecting other mobile
devices and compromising the corporate resources. This can affect the productivity of
the employees, but it can also lead to bigger security breaches, such as unauthorized
access to confidential corporate information.
Following the high adoption of Android and iOS, malware developers have been
targeting the vulnerabilities found in these mobile Operating System (OS)es. The
number of malware has been increasing over the years, Android being the main target.
According to statistics from F-Secure Corporation [13], in the first quarter of 2013
there were 166 new mobility threats, 153 of them targeting Android devices; by the
9third quarter of the same year, there were a total of 259 new mobility threats, 252
being Android-specific. By the first quarter of 2014, there were 277 new mobile threats
identified, 275 of these threats targeted the Android platform [14].
The open-source philosophy behind Android is the reason why this mobile OS has
become the main target of malware. Android allows users to install applications from
different marketplaces, which generally present more malware [15]. Additionally, the
process used to publish applications in Google Play did not include any type of pre-
verification in the publishing procedure. This way, it is the user who had to make sure
that the application is free of any malware before installing it [16]. Recently, Google
changed this policy and now the mobile applications are verified before becoming
available in Google Play. [17].
2.1.3 Phishing
Phishing is a form of social engineering, which generally starts by e-mail, where the
user is led to a website that pretends to be a trusted one. The objective of this attack
is to have the user reveal personal information that can be used later. For example,
one of the most common phishing attacks is where the user receives an e-mail from a
bank. This e-mail contains a link to a fake e-banking website, where the user is asked
to type his or her credentials.
Trend-Micro reports two main reasons why mobile devices are being target of
phishing. First, the fact that mobile web browsers are not able to display enough
information related to security elements. Second, the fact that all mobile device
comes with a web browser that opens by default after a link has been clicked [18].
The same report mentions that 75% of the phishing attacks have the objective to
gather information related to financial activities.
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As an example of a phishing attack, an employee can be led to reveal his or her
corporate credentials, which in turn can be used to access all the content to which
the employee has been granted access. Based on the role of the employee, this could
lead to a massive leakage of secret corporate information.
2.1.4 Theft, Loss and Sale
Given the fact that mobile devices are small and portable, they can be easily stolen
or lost. A report from the Office of the New York State Attorney General [19] men-
tions that in 2013 nearly 3.1 million of mobile phones were stolen in the US. Stolen
mobile devices must be a concern for any enterprise. If the employee stored sensitive
corporate data on the mobile device, and if the device is not properly protected, that
data can be accessed by an unauthorized party.
In The Symantec Smartphone Honey Stick Project [20], the security company
intentionally lost 50 smartphones containing simulated corporate and personal data,
along with monitory tools to analyze how the smartphones were used after they were
found. The main goal behind this experiment was to inform the owners about what
to expect once their smartphones were lost. Their two main findings are: (1) it is
highly likely that a stranger will attempt to access personal and business information
if the phone is unprotected, and (2) the owner of the phone should not expect to be
contacted by the person who found the phone. Detailed statistics of their findings
can be found in Table 2.1 for corporate data, and in Table 2.2 for personal data. We
can see that in either corporate or personal data, the percentage of access is at least
40% for each of the categories, which indicates that an acceptable level of privacy or
confidentiality cannot be expected once a mobile phone has been lost.
Another important situation that presents a threat for corporate information is
11
Type of data Percentage
General 83
E-mail 45
HR-related files 40-53
Remote Admin app 49
Table 2.1: Percentage of corporate accessed data (based on information provided by
[20].)
Type of data Percentage
General 89
Photos 72
Password reset attempt 66
Social networking 60
E-mail 60
“Saved Password” file 57
Online banking app 43
Table 2.2: Percentage of personal accessed data (based on information provided by
[20].)
when employees sell their mobile devices to a third party. In this case, if the infor-
mation contained in the device has not been properly erased, corporate data can be
leaked. According to a study from CPP in 2011 [21], 54% of the second hand smart-
phones sold contain extensive personal data which includes credit and debit card PIN
numbers, bank account details, passwords, phone numbers, company information and
log in details to social networking sites like Facebook and LinkedIn. In that study
81% of the previous owners claimed that the data was properly deleted, with 60%
being confident that all the personal data was removed.
AVAST Software conducted an experiment that showed the risks related to selling
a mobile device [22]. In this experiment, the researchers purchased from ebay 20
Android smartphones that supposedly had all their data erased. From that set of
devices, the researchers were able to recover more than 40,000 photos, 750 e-mails
and text messages, and 250 contacts. Additionally, the security firm was able to obtain
the identity of the previous owner, and in one case one complete loan application was
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retrieved. According to AVAST, 80,000 used smartphones are listed for sale online
every day.
2.1.5 Extension of the Network
Wang et al. [23] describe the concept of BYOD devices and how they extend the
corporate network. Once a mobile device connects to the corporate network from
outside of the enterprise perimeter, for example using a Virtual Private Network
(VPN), it can be said that the device extends the size of the network, as the latter
geographically increases its range. This creates a threat since network administrators
and security officers cannot efficiently control this increment in the size of the network,
which in turn enables the possibility of attacks from unprotected or compromised
devices. Further, since mobile devices can be used as Wi-Fi hotspots, they can provide
outsiders access to the corporate network [24]. Consequently, in order to achieve an
acceptable level of security in the corporate network, it is extremely important to
have the BYOD devices to comply with all security policies and good practices set
by the enterprise.
2.1.6 Insider Attack
Salem et al. [25] provide an excellent survey on insider attacks detection. This survey
introduces the concept of this type of attack by giving an example of a compromised
cell phone. The authors provide evidence that insider attacks have become a bigger
threat than malware. Since the security countermeasures are focused on unauthorized
and illegitimate access to the corporate network, threats that result from the misuse
of devices inside the network represent the biggest source of most damaging malicious
activities. According to this survey, there are two types of malicious insiders: traitors
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and masqueraders. While the former is an employee that has authorization and can
access the company assets, the latter is an employee that steals the identity (and the
privileges) of a valid user in order to execute malicious activities.
In the context of BYOD environments, it is extremely important to secure the
network against insider attacks, as the mobile devices are authorized to connect to
the corporate network. If no protection against these types of attack is deployed, it
becomes trivial for any malware to perform malicious activities despite the intentions
of the employee.
2.1.7 Compromised Corporate Network Attacking Mobile
Devices
So far, we have discussed the problems where the use of mobile devices can compro-
mise the security of the corporate network. However, it is imperative to also consider
the case where an already compromised network threats mobile devices, as in this case
the devices are also used for personal activities. In other words, we need to consider
the problem from the employee’s perspective, since he or she could connect a per-
sonal device to a network that might contain malware, compromising the employee’s
personal data. It becomes interesting to explore the behavior of the enterprise and
the position it adopts under this type of situations, as the enterprise must detect
and eliminate any type of threat to the devices. Otherwise, employees would be dis-
couraged from making use of the BYOD policies, which in turn would reduce their
productivity and job satisfaction.
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2.2 Security Challenges Related to BYOD
Environment
Based on the threat model presented in the previous section, we can introduce a set of
challenges that a secure BYOD environment present. While the first three challenges
were identified by Wang et al. [23], the last one was discussed by Miller et al. [26].
We present these four challenges as follows.
2.2.1 Data leakage
We categorize the corporate data as public or confidential. In the first category, the
information is freely distributed by the enterprise. However, for the second category,
the enterprise spends resources to prevent data leakage.
In a BYOD environment, employees have access to the confidential information
through their mobile devices. Considering all the threats that affect mobile devices,
there are challenges related to how to secure the corporate information once it reached
such devices.
2.2.2 Unauthorized sharing of spaces
In BYOD environments we can define two spaces: a personal space and a corporate
space. On the one hand, the personal space includes all applications and documents
owned by the employee such as family photos, personal contacts, or leisure applica-
tions like games. On the other hand, the corporate space includes all the applications
and documents related to the enterprise, such as corporate emails and contact lists as
well as productivity applications provided by the enterprise, like a spreadsheet editor.
The challenge in securing BYOD environments is how to keep these two spaces
15
isolated from each other. In other words, to provide mechanisms to prevent the access
of personal data from enterprise-related tasks, and vice versa.
2.2.3 Lack of security compliance
In many BYOD scenarios the enterprise finds it difficult to enforce its security policies
due to the fact that the employees are the owners of the mobile devices. For example,
if the policies state that mobile devices must run antiviruses to prevent malware, the
enterprise must check that all devices comply with this directive. Further, testing
device-by-device is not an option since it is time consuming and does not scale well.
2.2.4 Employee privacy
There is concern related to employee’s privacy, as companies might monitor the em-
ployee’s personal activities as well as analyze his or her personal information. This
is specially a concern when he or she is connected to the corporate network, as the
later could potentially track all the data in the network. Consequently, the employee
might not feel comfortable using his or her mobile device, which negatively affects
productivity and job satisfaction, and defeats the purpose of BYOD policies.
2.3 Goals for a Secure BYOD Environment
Considering the challenges described in section 2.2, a set of goals can be defined for
secure BYOD environments. Wang et al. [23] have described the first three goals in
the following list, while the remaining three have been identified by Gimenez Ocano
et al. [9]. The latter authors stated that the first set of goals are necessary but
not sufficient to achieve the goal of a secure BYOD environment, since they do not
consider the resource constraints of the mobile devices, the privacy invasion that a
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employee might experience, and other situations that the first set of goals does not
address.
2.3.1 Space Isolation
This goal addresses the challenge of unauthorized sharing of spaces. This is achieved
by isolating the personal space from the corporate space in such a way that no data
can be sent from one space to another.
However, the implementation of space isolation does not prevent situations where
the enterprise performs a restoration to factory default configuration, with the purpose
of deleting all confidential information located in the device. This is not desirable
because, under these circumstances, the employee would lose all the data saved in the
personal space.
2.3.2 Corporate Data Protection
The confidential information of the enterprise must remain secret even after a mobile
phone is sold, lost or stolen. In this way, only authorized employees can access the
information. Cryptographic algorithms can be used to cipher the corporate data such
that only the employee that has the key can access such data.
2.3.3 Security Policy Enforcement
Since policy enforcement is hard to achieve for mobile devices, one of the goals is to
make this enforcement automatic through the use of software. Moreover, because it
results unfeasible to check each mobile device at the time, policy enforcement must
be performed through automatic checkups based on software.
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Additionally, a solution should include mechanisms to translate policies into soft-
ware configuration that comply with them.
2.3.4 True Space Isolation
Even though space isolation is enough to avoid data sharing between the personal
space and the corporate space, corporate data should not be saved in mobile devices.
This goal addresses situations where the mobile device is sold, lost or stolen and,
even though there is space isolation and data protection, the data could still be
theoretically recovered by cracking the encryption algorithm.
With true space isolation, this issue can be addressed by storing the corporate
data only in corporate resources, while preventing the personal data to be sent to the
enterprise. In this way, even if the mobile device is sold, lost or stolen, the corporate
data remains protected.
2.3.5 Non-intrusiveness
From the employee’s perspective, a BYOD solution should not require any privileged
permissions on mobile devices, as the employee can be suspicious about invasion of
privacy. Agents or monitoring applications should also be avoided because of the
same reasons. Even if the installed agent does not invade the personal space, the
employee might be suspicious.
Additionally, solutions should not modify the operating system or use a custom
ROM that disrupts mobile devices’ original configuration. This type of modification
can be against the terms of use, as it is shown in section 2(d) of the iOS License
Agreement provided by Apple [27], and void the guaranty of the mobile device. Fur-
ther, this type of solution requires manually saving the original configuration, and
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then installing and uninstalling such custom mobile OS by the IT department, which
does not scale well. Moreover, there might be situations where the employee leaves
the enterprise and could not recover the original configuration.
2.3.6 Low Resource Consumption
Any solution should consider the scarcity of resources proper of mobile devices. This
means that solutions that require the use of heavy processing or RAM memory can
affect the usual behavior of the mobile device, which might lead to a decrease of
adoption from the employees.
In this chapter we have provided a background related to the threats that mobile
devices present, the security challenges related to BYOD environments, and the nec-
essary goals for a secure BYOD environment. In the following chapter we will discuss
the solutions available for BYOD scenarios. We will classify them according to their
type and we will discuss the goals they achieve.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
There are different solutions used in BYOD environments. These solutions provide
different features and address some of the goals listed in Section 2.3. We can classify
them based on their type in MVM, Agent-based, Cloud-based, VPN, Trusted Envi-
ronment and Framework. In general, solutions that are in the same category achieve
the same set of goals. However, solutions classified as framework might not meet the
same goals. In Figure 3.1 we provide a detailed taxonomy of the solutions for BYOD
environments that will be covered in the rest of the section.
Solutions
Mobile VM
Heavy Duty
Lightweight
Agent-based
MDM
MAM
MIM
VPN
Standards
Commercial Applications
Trusted Environment Framwork
Research-based Solutions
Commercial Solutions
Cloud-based
Figure 3.1: Taxonomy of BYOD solutions.
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3.1 MVM
The use of VMs for separating the personal space from the corporate space is discussed
by Wang et al. [23], with references to the work of Andrus et al. [28] and Barr et
al. [29]. Mijat et al. [30] provide a good description of how virtualization works. In
order to offer virtualization, a thin control software called Virtual Machine Monitor
(VMM) is used between the OS and the hardware. Then, the VMM can run with
privileged permissions and can host different OSes, which in turn run in a sandbox
denoted VM. The VMM coordinates the access from the OSes to the hardware in a
way that the OSes can use the hardware resources as if they had exclusive access to
them. These OSes are called guest OSes.
There are two types of virtualization: full virtualization and paravirtualization. In
the first case, the guest OS does not know that it is part of a virtualized environment
and it does not require any type of addition or modification. Full virtualization
provides the best solution if isolation is required, but it is at the expense of extra
resource requirements and complexity in the VMM. Paravirtualization is achieved by
modifying the guest OS in a way they have direct access to the VMM. This way, the
complexity and requirements for implementing a VM environment can be decreased.
An example of full virtualization for mobile phones is INTEGRITY Multivisor
[31], which has been implemented in mobile phone architectures by supporting ARM
TrustZone [32]. However, most of solutions in for mobile devices are based on paravir-
tualization. In a BYOD environment, VMs can be implemented by using a special
VM software designed for mobile devices. This way, separation of spaces is achieved
by deploying different OSes on the mobile device and assigning one guest OS for each
space.
In addition to separation of spaces, VMs can provide data protection by imple-
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menting cryptographic primitives. However, they cannot meet the goals related to
true space isolation, as the corporate data remains on the mobile phone. Further,
they do not offer policy enforcement, they consume computational resources, and
they can be intrusive to the user since additional software is needed.
For the case of paravirtualization, we can differentiate between heavy duty VMs
and lightweight VMs. In the rest of this section we provide examples of heavy duty
and lightweight mobile virtual machines.
3.1.1 Heavy Duty
According to Wang et al. [23], heavy-duty VMs allow the user to install multiple
instances of an operating system. However, support from vendors might not be
available. We present an example of a heavy duty VM as follows.
3.1.1.1 VMWare Horizon
VMware Horizon Mobile is an Android application that allows the user to run a guest
OS on top of the main OS on the mobile device, creating a container for the corporate
space, which is isolated from the personal space [33]
Barr et al. [29] describe the components of MVWare Mobile Virtualization Plat-
form (MVP), which includes a VMM for the ARM architecture, an enterprise virtual
phone and a remote device management software. The authors designed this so-
lution considering the goals of portability, compatibility, security, low-complexity,
performance, manageability and OEM time-to-market. In order to describe their vir-
tualization platform, the researches discuss how some of the components of mobile
devices are virtualized. For example, the VMM components and the VM images are
encrypted and stored on the existing host file system.
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In terms of security, VMWare MVP provides isolation by creating two separate
environments. While the host environment corresponds to the user space and it does
not offer any restriction, the enterprise environment is used for the corporate space
and the administrators have control over the privileges in it. Further, applications in
the user space cannot access the corporate space. Finally, while booting, a chain for
trust is created in order to guarantee the integrity of the image corresponding to the
corporate space.
One of the main drawbacks of this alternative is its limited scope of application,
since only some devices from LG and Motorola are compatible [34]. Although this
virtualization software is additionally provided with a management server software
that allows the administrator to control the applications installed in corporate space,
this type of solution is not present in iOS and it has been replaced by desktop virtu-
alization technologies [35].
3.1.2 Lighweight
This type of virtual machine does not provide all the features that a heavy duty
solution can offer as they do not allow the use of multiple guest OSes. However in
terms of resources, they are not as demanding as the heavy duty alternatives. We
present examples of lightweight VMs as follows.
3.1.2.1 Cells
Andrus et al. [28] present Cells, which is a virtualization architecture whose goal is
to virtualize mobile phones. According to the authors, the current solutions do not
provide an effective solution for virtualization that takes advantage of all the compo-
nents that a hardware mobile device has. As Cells is a lightweight OS virtualization,
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it only uses one OS and offers virtual namespaces that run multiple virtual phones.
There is a clever set of considerations that the researchers took into account. First,
they exploit the fact that mobile OSes only show one application at the time. This
way, only the virtual phone that is on the foreground is given access to the hardware.
Second, in order to provide communication, each virtual phone is provided with VoIP
capabilities, as opposed to use multiple SIM cards. Finally, in their implementation
the authors of Cells note that their approach scales much better than heavy duty VM
and it fully takes advantage of all the hardware that a mobile device offers.
Cells uses a unique kernel that is in charge of virtualizing identifiers, kernel in-
terfaces, and hardware resources, which are then employed by the execution environ-
ment of each virtual phone. In order to provide isolated virtual phones, Cells uses
namespaces, which are identifiers for the virtual phones. At the kernel level, Cells
implements device driver wrappers, modifies the device subsystem and modifies the
device driver. At the user level, namespaces are also used as a proxy mechanism
in order to provide same features to devices that closed source. This mechanism is
also used for settings that are particular to each user space. The file system is also
virtualized using different mount namespaces, which allows different virtual phones
to access the file system in an isolated fashion.
In order to manage the virtual phones, Cells includes a root namespace that is
isolated from the other virtual phones, and which has access to the entire file system.
During the initialization phase, a custom process is copied with the new namespace.
According to the authors, the advantages of Cells are in terms of scalability and se-
curity. For the former, the use of the same base system, the implementation of shared
memory for virtual phones and the use of Android low memory increase the number
of virtual phones that can be run. For the latter, the use of isolation techniques secure
each virtual phone from the other.
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Cells has been implemented and evaluated, being able to run up to five virtual
phones in Nexus 1 and Nexus S without any significant overhead. Further, a human
UI test showed that no visible performance degradation.
3.1.2.2 L4Android
Lange et al. [36] introduce L4Android, which is defined by its authors as a framework
rather than a VM. However, the topic of their research can be classified into the VM
category.
The authors of L4Android state that the security issues related to Android are
inherent to its monolithic architecture and the permissions required by their subsys-
tems. They state that if one of these subsystems has a bug, it might affect the rest
of the components and increase all of its permissions.
L4Android focuses on component isolation, where the subsystems are encapsulated
into components that run in protected domains. Communication between components
is still possible. In order to provide security to the kernel, this solution uses L4Linux,
a port of Linux to the researcher’s microkernel. This microkernel is in charge of
providing protection of domains, execution, communication, interrupt calls, schedul-
ing, and the creation of objects and virtualization containers. Another component of
L4Android is the runtime environment, which provides services and libraries to the
applications. For the runtime environment, the researches selected L4RE. The VMM
selected for this project is Karma, which provides paravirtualization, and supports
Android as a guest OS.
Lange et al. [36] provide a set of evaluation scenarios, being one of them a BYOD
environment, where there is a personal space and a corporate space. They mention
that using L4Android it can be possible to securely unify both spaces in a single
mobile device. In their example, two instances of L4Android were deployed.
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The researchers mention that the isolation not only must be enforced between
the guest OSes, but also at the user interface. Further, access to the hardware must
be multiplexed by implementing drivers with multiple profiles but are shown to the
guest OSes as a single device.
3.2 Agent-based Solutions
Agent-based solutions are alternatives that provide security policies and other features
by installing a mobile application on the BYOD device. In the corporate network,
there is another software that is in charge of establishing the set of rules and profiles
that the different mobile devices will have. The mobile application needs special
privileges on the mobile devices, as it is used to enforce configuration and profiles
based on the rules determined by the administrators.
Although the most popular type of agent-based solution is Mobile Device Man-
agement (MDM), we can also find Mobile Application Managements (MAMs) and
Mobile Information Management (MIM). In the rest of this section we will discuss
these three alternatives.
Agent-based solutions are intrusive to the user, as the agent needs special privileges
to monitor the mobile devices, as well as to enforce the security policies. These
solutions do not provide any form of space isolation since the user space and the
corporate space are stored on the mobile device. Agent-based alternatives are not
resource-intensive and they might provide corporate data protection by enforcing the
use of cryptography.
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3.2.1 MDM
Leavitt [37], Eslahi et al. [38] and Scarfo [39] elaborate on MDM. In this solution, the
main objective of the agent is to monitor the mobile device, transfer the application
and user data to the server, and enforce policies and allow security mechanisms such as
remote wiping. The agent is generally downloaded through application marketplaces,
either public or owned by the enterprise. This way, the MDM server can execute
commands on the BYOD device in order to lock down, control, encrypt, prevent the
use of sensors, prevent information leakage and enforce policies. Additionally, MDMs
allow the enterprise to distribute software on the mobile devices.
Wang et al. [23] list a series of drawbacks related to MDMs solutions. First, users
can have more than one role in the enterprise and MDM have shown issues to handle
that type of scenario. Second, enterprises can have policies that cannot be enforced
by MDM alternatives, or have policies that are in direct conflict with the ones offered
by the MDM software. Finally, since separation of spaces is not provided, it results
impossible to implement different policies for the user data and applications, losing
flexibility in the personal space. Also, Leavitt [37] points out that MDMs do not deal
with hacker attacks, nor theft or loss of the mobile device.
In the market, we can find different MDM solutions, some of them named Enter-
prise Mobility Management (EEM). We provide a list of the most popular as follows.
3.2.1.1 AirWatch by VMware
AirWatch is a solution offered by VMWare for device management [40]. This solution
allows managing devices in a central administration console that allows enrolling
devices, and configuring and updating their settings. This alternative is presented
either in the corporate network or as a cloud solution.
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For mobile devices, this alternative is available for Android and iOS, among other
platforms. In the enterprise side, it can be integrated with AD/LDAP directories
to take advantage of domains, groups and device profiles, mobile applications and
content. Device enrollment is available through an agent, a QR code, email or SMS.
User authentication can be performed by username-password combination, directory
services credential, token or proxy.
AirWatch offers tracking of unauthorized users, compromised devices and other
risk. Additionally, the system notifies the administrators in case of detecting any risk.
Further, administrators can send commands to the registered devices to either query
for information or to take actions. These actions can be simple like sending mes-
sages or finding devices to more complex such as clearing passcodes, locking devices,
performing a remote view or wiping the device.
3.2.1.2 Amtel MDM
Amtel [41] [42] [43] offers a cloud-based solution for both Android and iOS at the
device side, while supporting LDAP/AD for the enterprise side. One of the features
of is the fact that users can perform a self-enrollment in the system.
Amtel allows different type of actions that can be taken on mobile devices, such
as monitoring, removing unauthorized devices, locking and removing passwords, wip-
ing phone content, detection of rooted devices as well as blocking web content. For
Android devices, GPS tracking is also available. Moreover, Amtel offers support for
Samsung KNOX, a framework solution detailed in 3.6.2.2. In terms of device config-
uration, this solution offers settings configuration for email, VPN, Wi-Fi, Calendar,
credentials and keys.
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3.2.1.3 BlackBerry BES10
BlackBerry [44] offers a single point of control that integrates LDAP/AD for authenti-
cation and role-based administration. The devices supported by this solution include
Android and iOS. Device activation is over-the-air and devices can be enrolled either
by administrators using a combination of email and activation password, or by users.
This solution provides reporting tools to the administrators as well as configu-
ration capabilities such as certificate distribution for accessing Wi-Fi, VPN or other
corporate resources.
BES10 can enforce how devices connect to the network through Wi-Fi or VPN,
disable the use of the camera, enforcing the password rules, detecting and rejecting
rooted devices or devices that do not comply with the policies. Users can be notified
about lack of compliance. Additionally, this solution provisions certificates. Actions
that can be performed with BES10 include locking the device, password reset and
wiping information from the device.
3.2.1.4 CA MDM
CA Technologies offers an MDM solution that includes a framework of policies for
enrolling, configuring and onboarding devices [45]. Further, it offers analysis tools
in order to track the devices, their expenses in terms of communication, and their
security compliance.
The solution offered by CA Technologies can be implemented through the Cloud
or installed inside the corporate network. On the device side, support for Android as
well as iOS is provided.
Besides obtaining analytics from the devices, this MDM can also perform actions
on them, such as locking, fully or selectively wiping the content of a device, remotely
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locating a device, resetting its passcode, removing enterprise controls, and unregis-
tering the device. On the server side, this solution can be integrated with LDAP/AD
and certification authorities.
3.2.1.5 Citrix XenMobile Device Manager
This solution [46] [47] provides role-based management, configuration and security
to mobile devices, as it can enroll and manage devices, detects if devices are rooted
or out of compliance, as well as locate devices and monitor them. The actions that
this product can perform range from blocking access to corporate data or locking the
device to a full or selective wipe.
On the server side, XenMobile can be integrated with LDAP/AD to manage
groups, users and profiles either as a cloud service or inside the corporate network.
Moreover, it also provides support for certificates. Supported devices include Android
and iOS.
In terms of administration, policies can be implemented based on the type of OS;
and it allows to configure device properties such as passcodes, encryption, Wi-Fi and
VPN. Enrollment can be performed via email or SMS through URLs or PINs.
3.2.1.6 Dell EMM
This alternative from Dell [48] provides support for both Android and iOS devices.
Since this solution is offered on the Cloud, no requirements are needed for the enter-
prise other than a web browser.
In terms of device management, Dell EEM offers over-the-air configuration, with
policies automatically updated from the Cloud. Enrolling and registration is per-
formed directly by the users. Further, different policies can be implemented using
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a graphical interface with geo-location. This solution provides real time of device
tracking, its applications and its configuration.
Finally, the type of actions that can be performed include simple tasks such as
querying the device, auditing it or sending it a message, to more complex one such as
locking the mobile device, clearing its passcode, unregistering it or even wiping the
content in it.
3.2.1.7 Good MDM
The MDM alternative offered by Good Technology [49] [50] supports a cloud-based
central location to configure and control any device over the air. On the server side,
this solution can be integrated with Microsoft AD, allowing group management. On
the user end, Android and iOS are supported by this MDM.
This alternative can enforce policies such as password, device encryption, camera,
Wi-Fi, and VPN configuration. Other features offered are root detection, password
reset, and reports such as device status, installed apps, utilization and expenses.
Enrollment can be performed by the user using URLs or through a mobile application.
In addition, actions such as data wiping and configuration removal are also provided.
3.2.1.8 IBM MaaS360
This cloud-based solution by IBM [51] [52] offers support for both Android and iOS
mobile devices, while integrating LDAP/AD run by the enterprise. This allows cre-
ating customized policies and applying them to users and groups.
MaaS360 provides configuration for email, calendars, contacts, Wi-Fi and VPN.
It allows to authorize or reject new devices in the network, as well as actions such
as locating lost or stolen devices, resetting passwords, sending messages to devices,
updating configuration settings, and deleting the corporate data and MDM config-
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uration in the device. Further, this solution enforces security by specifying policies
related to passcodes and encryption, as well as detecting rooted devices and creating
location-related policies.
In terms of monitoring, this solution offers features that include reports of hard-
ware and software inventory and mobile expense management, configuration and vul-
nerability. Finally, enrollment can be performed using SMS, email or URL.
3.2.1.9 McAfee EMM
EEM [53] is a broader solution that offers MDM capabilities. It can support both
Android as well as iOS devices. Management of the devices is performed through
a centralized infrastructure located inside the corporate network, which supports
LDAP/AD and groups.
The main features of this solution are enforcing the use of anti-malware, detection
of rooted devices, enforcement of authentication, authorization and encryption, access
restriction based on device type or OS. Additionally, it enforces policies related to
password, restriction related to download applications, access to the camera, selecting
which applications can open attached files, or backing up information on the Cloud.
This solution can deliver configuration provisioning for VPN and Wi-Fi. Finally, it
can remotely lock devices, wipe the entire device or just remove corporate information
on devices that have been lost or stolen.
In terms of monitoring and report, this alternative can provide reports related to
mobile policy compliance, threat events, application reputation, and other metrics.
Moreover, when a user is out of compliance, he or she receives automatic notifications
explaining the reasons why the device is in this situation.
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3.2.1.10 Microsoft Intune
Intune is a cloud-based MDM solution by Microsoft [54] [55], meaning that the en-
terprise does not need to deploy any additional infrastructure in the network. On the
user side, devices running Android as well as iOS are supported. Intune is part of
Microsoft’s suit of solutions on the Cloud, which includes user administration through
Azure Active Directory Premium. Configuration is also handled by Intune, as it is
able to provide certificates for email, Wi-Fi and VPN.
Users can perform the enrollment process by accessing a web page. Intune can be
used for implementing of policies in order to reject access to the corporate resources
from unauthorized or out of compliance devices. Further, this MDM allows actions
such as password reset, device lock, rooted device detection, enforcement of data
encryption, and full wipe for lost or stolen mobile devices.
3.2.1.11 MobileIron EMM
This solution from MobileIron [56] [57] [58] can be implemented either by deploying
the infrastructure inside the corporate network or by using a service hosted on the
Cloud. On the other end, support is provided for Android and iOS.
Mobile Iron EEM offers integration with LDAP/AD, including role-based access
and implements group policies, configuration provisioning for Wi-Fi, email and VPN
is given over-the-air. This solution additionally offers certificate distribution, as well
as rooted device detection. Further, this alternative provides email attachment pro-
tection. Actions that can be performed on the devices include recovery of lost devices,
selective wipe, broadcast messages and notification of current compliance. Finally,
for reporting purposes, MibileIron collects data related to device, applications, user
and status, which are displayed in a management and reporting console.
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3.2.1.12 SAP Afaria
SAP Afaria [59] [60] is a solution that offers MDM capabilities for Android and iOS
mobile devices. This solution can be implemented on the Cloud, as well as on-premise.
Enrollment can be performed by the users. SAP Afaria includes group policy.
Reporting, monitoring and managing capabilities are performed in a centralized
console. The console shows data related to device tracking, device type, usage moni-
toring and logging for applications and usage statistics. Additionally, automatic alerts
and controls can be implemented to provide real-time cost management.
For configuration provisioning, SAP Afaria offers certificate delivery for single
sign-on to the corporate resources and data encryption, as well as email, Wi-Fi and
VPN configuration. This solution can enforce password policies, peripheral controls
such as locking down the camera. Activities performed on the mobile device include
remote lock and data wiping, or rejection of devices that do not comply with the
corporate policies.
3.2.1.13 SOTI MobiControl
SOTI offers a MDM solution [61] that can be deployed in the corporate network or as
a service based on the Cloud. This alternative can be integrated with LDAP, allowing
the use of group configuration. The list of devices supported includes Android and
iOS. Mobi Control provides a self-service portal where users can reset password, wipe
data, lock devices or find lost devices through geo-location information.
MobiControl offers the administrators monitoring as it can provide statistics on
status of connectivity, device information, location and active policies, as well as mon-
itor device, custom data, and server-specific incidents. In addition, this solution can
determine when a device has been rooted. This way administrators can determine
34
when a device has been compromised and take actions. Administrators can addition-
ally enforce policies over incoming and outgoing calls. Finally, policy enforcement
includes strong passwords and the use of cryptographic primitives.
3.2.1.14 Symantec Mobile Management
Symantec’s solution for MDM [62] is a centralized approach that can be developed
inside the corporate network or on the Cloud. It implements LDAP/AD support
for authentication and group membership and role-based access control. The devices
supported by this solution include Android and iOS.
Synmatc’s product offers enrollment to the users as a self-service process. This
solution provides automated configuration and certificates that facilitates network
access for email, VPN and Wi-Fi. In terms of policies, it allows password enforcement,
application restrictions and remote wipe. Additionally it detects when devices have
been rooted.
Administrators can obtain custom or predefined reports including information
related to user, devices, applications, and profiles.
3.2.1.15 Comparison
In Table 3.1, we provide a qualitative comparison between all the MDM solutions
that we have listed. It can be seen that all the solutions described provide similar
features in term of the configuration provisioning, the actions that can be take on the
mobile devices, and the type of supported mobile OSes. However, there are differences
in terms of how the solutions are deployed, since some of the alternatives are only
cloud-based solutions, and the possibility of provision geo-located data, which let the
enterprise know where the mobile device is and enforce policies based on that location.
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Solution
AirWatch by VMware [40] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Amtel MDM [41] [42] [43] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
BlackBerry BES10 [44] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
CA MDM [45] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Citrix XenMobile
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3Device Management [46] [47]
Dell EMM [48] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Good MDM [49] [50] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IBM MaaS360 [51] [52] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
McAfee EMM [53] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Microsoft Intune [54] [55] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
MobileIron EMM [56]
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3[57] [58]
SAP Afaria [59] [60] 3 3 3 3 3 3
SOTI MobiControl [61] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Symantec Mobile
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3Management [62]
Table 3.1: Comparison between the different types of MDM solutions.
3.2.2 MAM
After reviewing MDM solutions, we will focus on the second category of agent-based
solutions: MAM. According to Leavitt [37], Eslahi et al. [38] and Scarfo [39], MAM
goal is to manage and limit the mobile applications on the BYOD devices. Addition-
ally, MAMs control that only authorized applications can access corporate data. This
solution allows the enterprise to implement policies on the use of mobile applications
by rejecting unauthorized applications, distribute them to devices, removing them,
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updating them, creating backups of them, auditing them, as well as enforcing policies
related to the behavior of the mobile applications. This way, only the applications
that are white-listed can access the corporate resources. Further, applications not
related to the enterprise get isolated from the corporate resources. However, commu-
nication between applications can be negatively impacted, and no data protection is
provided.
One important difference between MDM and MAM is that the former performs
its control at the hardware layer, while the latter control the software on the device.
Consequently, corporate policies could be enforced only to the applications related to
the enterprise. MAM and MDM are complementary solutions; this is the reason why
MAM solutions are integrated into MDM products.
3.2.3 MIM
Finally, after describing MDM and MAM, we review MIM solutions. According to
Eslahi et al. [38] and Scarfo [39], MIM alternatives focus on providing a centralized
entity that stores all the corporate data, as opposed to leting the mobile devices
store such content. Since all the corporate information is stored in a single place, it is
easier to guarantee the security of the information. One of the main advantages of this
solution is that it provides synchronization across different devices. Additionally, this
service can be hosted on the Cloud, with the advantages and disadvantages presented
in the following section.
3.3 Cloud-based Solutions
Leavitt [37] provides the use of solutions that rely on cloud storage in order to offer
mobile access to data as well as applications. These solutions provide space isolation
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since the personal data can reside on the mobile device, while the corporate data
is stored on the Cloud (personal data can also be stored online under a different
repository). True space isolation is also guaranteed, because the corporate data is
not hosted on the mobile device. However, Leavitt [37] points out that isolation is
no longer guaranteed once the data gets downloaded to the mobile device. Further,
access to the corporate data must be properly configured and managed by either the
user or a system administrator.
These solutions additionally provide protection to the corporate data, as cloud-
based solutions offer encryption. Cloud-based solutions are not intrusive to the user,
since there is no need to install any special software to access the online data through
a default web browser. However, many cloud-based storage providers offer mobile ap-
plications that directly access the data repository, without browsing the web. Finally,
these solutions do not demand a high amount of resources from the mobile device,
other than network connectivity.
For most of the enterprises it is impossible to deploy a cloud-based solution that
satisfies their needs. Consequently, enterprises turn to third-party solutions that ad-
dress these needs in the form of cloud services for a fee. However, from the security
perspective, relying on a third-party implies losing a certain degree of control over
the corporate data and the need of trusting on the cloud storage service provider. For
example, IBM has banned the use of cloud storage and other cloud services as its em-
ployees were storing confidential data outside IBM’s network [24]. Additionally, cases
of mismanagement by the cloud storage provider have been reported [63]. Further,
because sensitive data is stored on cloud services, their service providers have become
the target of attacks [64] [65]. Finally, the case of password re-use must be taken
into account, since many users use the same type of credential for different services,
a repository that contains work-related data can be compromised because the log-in
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credentials userd for other services have been exposed [66] [67]. The enterprise must
trust on the provider with respect of the security measures the latter implements as
well as how the service is administrated.
There are two main categories in solutions for cloud storage, one that targets
small and big business, and another for consumers. In the first group we can find
solutions such as Acronis True Image Online [68], ADrive [69], Bitcasa [70], Carbonite
[71], Copy (owned by Barracuda Networks, Inc) [72], CrashPlan [73], Egnyte [74],
Hightail [75], IDrive [76], JustCloud [77], Livedrive [78], Mankayia [79], Mozy (owned
by EMC Corporation) [80], OpenDrive [81], SOS Online Backup [82], SpiderOak [83],
SugarSync [84] and Zip Cloud [85]. All of them provide mobile applications for both
iOS and Android, making them suitable for BYOD environments. Additionally, it can
be seen that there are many companies in this area; however in a report from Ovum
cited by Business Cloud News [86] it is claimed that 89% of employees use consumer-
focused cloud storage solution instead of a business-focused alternative. Further, the
consumerization of these services lead some these business-oriented solutions to also
compete in the end-user market.
There are fewer options available in the end-user market. However, these solutions
additionally offer service plans for business use. A list of the most popular consumer-
oriented solutions is presented as follows.
3.3.1 Box
Box [87] is solution that only focuses on cloud storage. It offers several plans ranging
from 10GB to unlimited storage, with different fees for different storage capacities.
These plans are divided into personal, starter, business, enterprise and elite. This
service provides support for mobile devices, since it provides mobile applications for
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Android as well as iOS. From the security perspective, Box offers SSL and At Rest
Encryption with 256-bit AES, and Two-factor authentication. However, mobile ap-
plications for end users do not offer Two-factor authentication but a simple password
protection, as multi-factor authentication and password enforcement is only available
for the enterprise and elite plans. In terms of content access management, the free
alternatives do not provide user management, while the business, enterprise and elite
plans offer this feature. Additionally, these last three services also offer MDM inte-
gration. Privacy is also addressed, as Box has been certified for EU and Swiss Safe
Harbor frameworks and it is in compliance with HIPAA regulations. Finally, Box
provides the possibility of file edition through integration with third-party vendors.
3.3.2 Dropbox
Dropbox [88], just like Box, is a service that only focuses on cloud storage. The
plans offered by this solution are classified into basic, pro and business, with storage
capacities that range from 2GB for a single personal use, to unlimited for the business
plan. Mobile devices are supported by this solution, with mobile applications for
Android as well as iOS. Dropbox provides transfer security through SSL and storage
encryption by implementing AES-256. This solution offers Two-Factor authentication
but only when a mobile device is linked to an account for the first time. Additionally,
password protection can be enabled for the mobile clients. Dropbox supports group
sharing, meaning that they implement a role based access management on the folders
and files to be shared, but this feature is only available for the business plan. Mobile
file editing is not natively supported, but is available through the use of third-party
software. Finally, in terms of standards and regulations, Dropbox complies with
ISO 27001, SOC 3 for Security, Confidentiality, and Integrity, SOC 2 for Security,
40
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability, SOC 1 / SSAE 16 / ISAE 3402 (formerly
SAS 70), PCI DSS, and U.S.-E.U. and U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor.
3.3.3 Google Drive
Google Drive [89] is the cloud storage service by Google. Just like any other solution
in the market, they offer plans for personal use and for business. The former offers
15GB, which are shared by all the services offered by Google, while the latter offers
unlimited storage capacity. Drive provides integration with mobile devices, as mobile
applications for Android and iOS are available. When it comes to security for data
transfer and storage, Drive claims that files are encrypted during data transfer from
the device to Google, between Google’s datacenters and when it is stored on the
mobile devices. However, it is not mentioned which standards are implemented to
achieve these features, nor the fact that the stored files are encrypted in Google’s
servers. Google offers Two-step verification for their accounts, but in mobile devices
this feature is only used when the device is verified for the first time. For access
management, Drive offers data sharing and group sharing. The latter is achieved by
setting up a group email. Since Google offers also Google Docs, edition of files is
available without the need of a third-party application, although third-party support
is available. Drive has been certified with SSAE 16 / ISAE 3402 Type II, SOC 2
and ISO 27001. Additionally, for privacy, Drive complies with FISMA, FERPA, and
HIPAA, and adheres to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.
3.3.4 iCloud
iCloud [90] is the storage solution offered by Apple Inc. This service is only available
for end-users, with storage capacities that go from 5GB to 1TB. Just like any software
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from Apple, iCloud is tightly integrated with the rest of the software suite that
the company offers, such as Notes, Calendar, Mail, Photos, etc. For BYOD access,
the service provider only offers mobile applications to devices that run iOS, leaving
Android support for third-party applications. File editing is offered through Pages,
Sheets and Slides. Since this solution is not offered to business, file sharing is not an
implemented feature. In terms of encryption, Apple claims that all data in transit is
encrypted using SSL, while data stored is encrypted using a minimum of AES-128.
Two-step authentication is also implemented for mobile devices, but it only employed
the first time a device is used to access the service.
3.3.5 OneDrive
OneDrive [91] is the cloud storage service provided by Microsoft. This solution pro-
vides end-user plans and business plans, with storage capacity from 15GB to 1TB.
OneDrive is available for mobile devices through mobile applications for Android and
iOS. Document editing in mobile devices is supported by OneDrive with an Office356
subscription, otherwise the user must use a third-party application. In terms of se-
curity, OneDrive implements SSL/TLS for file transfer, but it does not encrypts the
files when they are stored in Microsoft’s cloud servers [92]. Access management on
stored data has the feature of group sharing. OneDrive implements Two-factor au-
thentication that is also available for their mobile applications. Microsoft’s cloud
infrastructure has been certified for ISO 27001:2005, PCI DSS, FredRAMP P-ATO,
FISMA, and it is in compliance with SSAE16/ISAE 3402 SOC 1, AT101 SOC 2 and
3, and HIPPA.
Table 3.2 provides a summary and comparison of the features for different consumer-
oriented cloud-based solutions. We can observe that generally all the solutions provide
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Box [87] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Dropbox [88] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Google Drive [89] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
iCloud [90] 3 3 3 3
OneDrive [91] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table 3.2: Comparison between different consumer-oriented cloud-based solutions.
the same features, with the exception of iCloud, that does not provide the features
proper of an enterprise-focused solution. Additionally, we can mention that only Box
and OneDrive provide support for Two-factor authentication in their mobile applica-
tions.
So far we have discussed cloud-based solutions that are closed-source, meaning
that users and enterprises must trust what the providers claim. For example, a
provider must implement a security feature such as data encryption, but does do not
ensure that the implementation is correct and free of security issues. Open-source
cloud-based storage solutions try to overcome these concerns by publishing the code
they use to implement their solutions. In this space we can find different alternatives
such as Seafile [93], ownCloud [94], git-annex [95], SparkleShare [96], Syncthing [97],
Stacksync [98], OpenStack [99]. On the one hand, the enterprise can deploy and
maintain a server to provide this service to their user, while some of these alternatives
offer paid versions that offer more features and technical support. On the other hand,
most of them do not offer an iOS mobile application, which limits their capacity to
compete in the consumer market.
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3.4 Virtual Private Network (VPN)
The use of VPNs for BYOD environments is presented by Wang et al. [23], Leavitt
[37], Hayes [8] and Leong [100]. According to Peterson et. al. [101], a VPN is a
logical network that is deployed on top of a physical network, with the purpose of
interconnecting different nodes from different networks as if they were part of the
same private network. For example, for BYOD environments, the most common case
is presented when a mobile device that is connected to the Internet through a Wi-
Fi access point needs access to information located inside of the corporate network.
In this scenario, we say that a tunnel is created between the mobile device and the
network. The concept of tunneling is straightforward; it means to encapsulate one
packet inside of another. In the case of a VPN, the mobile device encapsulates the
packet for the private network in a packet for the Internet. This way, the Internet
forwards the Internet packet normally, but when the Internet packet reaches the
border of the corporate network it is opened and then the packet for the private
network is forwarded accordingly inside of the corporate network. Therefore, the
mobile device can join the corporate private network and access the data.
Tunnels can offer security with the addition of encryption techniques, as the en-
capsulated packet can be encrypted. This provides confidentiality to the commu-
nication, and it can also offer integrity of the messages. However, the use of VPN
creates a computational cost, as the information must be encrypted, and decreases
the throughput of the message, since we need to increase the size of the overhead by
sending additional information.
As mentioned before, VPNs only protect the communication between the BYOD
device and the corporate network. Consequently, it can be argued that this technology
only covers part of the goal of corporate data protection, since once the data is
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retrieved to the mobile device, it can no longer be secured. For example, if the mobile
phone is lost or stolen, all the corporate data on the phone is at risk. VPNs do not
provide any type of space isolation nor true space isolation, as nothing prevents the
personal and corporate data to be mixed on the mobile device. Additionally, VPNs
do not offer any type of security policy enforcement. However, this type of solution
is not resource intensive nor intrusive to the user.
Leavitt [37] states that although some enterprises have implemented the use of
VPNs and have set security policies to enforce the use of them, this does not pre-
vent the user from accessing insecure networks such as hotel Wi-Fi, where the mobile
devices can become targets of attacks. In this fashion, if a mobile device gets com-
promised, the corporate network can become compromised even if VPN was used to
access it.
Solutions in the space of VPN include standards and commercial applications. In
the case of standards, we have included the ones that are supported by Android and
iOS, since they are the most popular mobile operating systems. We present these
solutions as follows.
3.4.1 Standards
Standards are a series of protocols open to the public and well documented, generally
through RFCs.
3.4.1.1 L2TP/IPSec
L2TP/IPSec is a combination of two protocols. First, Layer Two Tunneling Protocol
(L2TP) [102] enables the use of VPN between the mobile device and the corporate
network by offering a dynamic mechanism for tunneling layer two circuits over a
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packet-oriented network, by specifying how to create, maintain and remove these cir-
cuits. But this protocol does not provide any type of security features. Second, the
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) [103] is a layer-three protocol that provides the
security features of encryption and integrity. In order to achieve them, IPSec relies
on four main elements: Security Protocols, Security Associations (SA), Key Manage-
ment and Cryptographic algorithms. The security protocols can be the Authentica-
tion Header (AH) protocol, which provides only integrity, or Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP), which provides both encryption as well as integrity protection. An SA
is a unidirectional connection that supports security services, identified by a number
called Security Parameter Index (SPI). Key management is provided by the Internet
Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [104], which is in charge of automatically creating the
keys needed for the SAs. Finally, the cryptographic algorithms used by this protocol
depend on the type of the security service that is needed [105]. For authenticated en-
cryption AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV should be supported and AES-CCM may be
supported. For encryption only, NULL and AES-CBC must be supported, AES-CTR
and TripleDES-CBC may be supported, and DES-CBC must not be supported. For
authentication only, HMAC-SHA1-96 must be supported, AES-GMAC with AES-128
and AES-XCBC-MAC-96 should be supported, and NULL may be supported. The
interaction between L2TP and IPSec is described in Patel et al. [106].
3.4.1.2 PPTP
The Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) [107] was developed by a vendor
consortium, and it describes a new alternative to route information through point-
to-point protocol (PPP) [108]. PPTP defines a client-server architecture in order
to decouple the tasks of a Network Access Server (NAS), while at the same time
offering VPN capabilities. In this protocol, the server is called PPTP Network Server
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(PNS), and the client is referred as PPTP Access Concentrator (PAC). In the PPTP
scenario, two communications are used at the same time, a Control Connection that
establishes, manages and releases the tunnel session, and the tunnel between the
PAC and the PNS. This tunnel transports Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)
[109] encapsulated PPP packets. Security features in PPTP can be achieved by
implementing Microsoft Point-To-Point Encryption (MPPE) Protocol [110], which
implements encryption by using RSA RC4. However, the authentication protocol
used by Microsoft MS-CHAPv1 and MS-CHAPv2 presents security issues and its use
is discouraged [111].
3.4.1.3 Cisco IPSec
Cisco IPSec [112] is the implementation of IPSec by the vendor, with the same fea-
tures in term of encryption and authentication by using AH and ESP, as well as a key
exchange protocol using IKE, and the implementation of SAs to describe the connec-
tions. Additionally, there is a certificate management by employing Simple Certificate
Enrollment Protocol (SCEP). The cryptographic primitives used by this protocol are
Diffie-Hellman in the IKE protocol, DES for packet encryption and MD5/SHA for
data integrity. The difference between Cisco IPSec and L2TP/IPSec is that in the
former no Layer 2 protocol is predefined.
3.4.2 Commercial Applications
Vendors provide their own VPN solutions. These alternatives are presented in the
form of mobile applications for both Android and iOS. On the enterprise side, com-
patible network hardware must be installed to offer access to these platforms.
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3.4.2.1 Cisco AnyConnect
AnyConnect from Cisco also provides secure VPN access by using Datagram Trans-
port Layer Security (DTLS), IPsec (IKEv2), and TLS (HTTP over TLS/SSL) [113].
In order to provide encryption, the cryptographic primitives implemented in these
protocols are AES-256 and 3DES-168 as well as NSA Suite B algorithms, ESPv3
with IKEv2, 4096-bit RSA keys, Diffie-Hellman group 24, and enhanced SHA2. For
authentication, AnyConnect is compatible with RADIUS, RSA SecurID, Active Direc-
tory/Kerberos and LDAP. It also offers the possibility of multi-factor authentication
by combining certificates and usernames with passwords. In addition, this solution
offers per-app VPN functions for iOS.
3.4.2.2 Juniper Junos Pulse
This product provides remote user to the corporate network by implementing SSL
VPN access. According to Juniper [114], Junos Pulse provides secure and authen-
ticated access for authorized users by using a dual-transport full layer three VPN
connectivity with granular access control. This dual-transport feature is achieved
with the implementation of SSL and ESP. Additionally, this solution has the feature
of endpoint integrity assessment, which checks the user device prior to authentication,
based on policies. Junos Pulse can be integrated with MDM solutions, leveraging the
management of the BYOD devices.
3.5 Trusted Environments
Trusted environments are solutions that deal with the fact that mobile devices might
run applications that cannot be trusted with sensitive information. There are different
alternatives to deal with this situation as some of the solutions are software-based
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and focus on warning the user, while others are implemented in the hardware and
address the problem by creating isolated environments.
3.5.1 Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
The use of TEEs is discussed by Ekberg et al. [115]. In TEEs a secure processing en-
vironment is separated and isolated from the processing environment that normally is
used by the OS and the applications, which is defined as Rich Execution Environment
(REE). This way, applications are provided with better security features by dividing
them into two parts. The first part does not contain any sensitive operations and
run in the REE, while the section that handles the sensitive operations run in the
TEE. According to the authors, mobile devices that include TEEs have the potential
of replacing any type of hardware used as an access token (i.e. keyfobs for two-factor
authentication, RF IDs). TEE is presented in most of the mobile devices, as the vast
majority of them include ARM’s TrustZone [32].
TEEs can be combined with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology for
mobile to increase the security features [116]. TPM [117] implements security prim-
itives in a separated cryptographic co-processor in order to enable trust computing
platforms. The cryptographic operations supported by the co-processor are Asym-
metric key generation (RSA), Asymmetric encryption and decryption (RSA), Hashing
(SHA-1), and Random number generation (RNG). Moreover, the mobile version not
only implements all these features but also includes secure boot, the introduction
of an alternative implementation such as a firmware TPM, and support for several
parallel TPM instances in the same device.
If we analyze the goals for a secure BYOD environment, we find that TEE can
offer space isolation as the data applications related to the enterprise can be separated
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from the personal data, it is not intrusive to the user and it does not require extra
resources from the device since it is built in the smartphone. However, it does not
provide any data encryption and the corporate data cannot be protected. Further,
it does not provide any means to implement security policies from the enterprise.
Finally, despite of the fact that space isolation is provided, no true space isolation is
present since the corporate data still resides at the mobile device.
3.5.2 TrustDroid
Zhao and Osono [118] introduced TrustDroid. In their research, the authors mention
the shift in the paradigm from trusted nodes in a trusted network to the combination
of a cloud environment and a BYOD environment, where data and applications reside
on the Cloud and user’s mobile devices are not considered trustworthy. Following their
argument, corporate data and applications cannot be protected.
TrustDroid addresses the problems related to this scenario by performing a static
analysis based on taint tracking. It assumes that the BYOD device runs applications
that are not trusted by the enterprise, which can lead to data leakage. TrustDroid
detects such scenarios and warns the user about this situation.
One of the features of this solution is that it can work in two modes, an off-line
mode where the analysis is performed by the corporate resources, and an on-line mode
where the analysis is performed by the mobile device, which creates an overhead of
resource consumption. However, TrustDroid provides means to set the granularity of
the analysis, reducing the recourse consumption overhead.
TrustDroid works by analyzing the bytecode of applications and tries to find en-
tries that manipulate sensitive data, according to a set of predefined rules. Sensitive
data is marked with a tag. Then, this tag follows the sensitive data as it processed
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by the bytecode.
If sensitive data is found, then it is marked with a tag that follows the data as the
latter flows through the byte code. Lastly, if the tagged data reaches a sink, such as
a network interface, the operation is flagged as leak activity by the byte code.
TrustDroid creates a trusted environment by notifying the user which applications
might leak sensitive information. On the one hand, it is not resource intensive since
the analysis has different degrees of granularity. On the other hand, this solution
does not provide any separation of spaces, it does not implement security policies,
and it can be intrusive to the user since its implementation is an application that
might analyze personal applications. Finally, even if data leakage can be prevented,
it does not fully provide corporate data protection since it does not address the case
where the data resides on the mobile device and the latter becomes lost or stolen.
3.5.3 MOSES
Russello et al. [119] are the authors of MOde-of-uses SEparation in Smartphones
(MOSES), a policy-based framework for enforcing software and data isolation on the
Android platform, using a lightweight approach.
These researchers focus on virtualization by using a controlled software isolation.
Security profiles are then applied to contexts that determine when a profile can be
activated. These contexts are characterized by a combination of low level features
such as time and location, and high level features like reputation and trust level.
MOSES provides a GUI that users can employ to specify the profiles and contexts.
Further, profiles have a high level of granularity by allowing controling single objects
and applications. Finally, the switching between profiles can be either manual or
automatic.
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MOSES offers a separation of data and applications in contexts that are isolated
from each other in a single mobile device. This way, the user space can be separated
from the corporate space. Compartments called security profiles are deployed in
order to achieve this isolation. These profiles are a group of policies that manage
the privileges of applications and the access to data. Since this solution allows the
management from an external administrator, it presents a similar characteristics to
the ones found in MDM solutions.
According to their work, there are two versions of MOSES. The first one, and
oldest, is based on TaintDroid [120] which labels data in order to know how sensitive
information is propagated by mobile applications on the mobile device. However, the
latest version of MOSES is based on a lightweight file system virtualization architec-
ture implemented at the Linux kernel, in order to achieve separation of spaces.
MOSES is a framework and includes several components. The first one is the
ContextDetectorSystem, which is in charge of detecting when contexts are activated or
deactivated. When one of these activities happen, the ContextDetectorSystem sends
a message to the SecurityProfileManager, which is in charge of establish the security
profiles for contexts. After a security profile is activated, the SecurityProfileManager
informs MosesHypervisor. The latter is the central security authority, which handles
the access to resources. Then MosesHypervisor delegates the policy checking to the
MosesAppManager and the MosesRulesManager, which decide which applications can
be run in the context and manage special rules, respectively.
The MosesPolicyManager is in charge of controlling the security policies by cre-
ating, modifying and deleting them. Further, it allows the user to manage contexts.
MosesTaintManager is responsible of managing the database that contains the taint
values used by the system. In order to enforce separated security profiles MOSES
uses MosesReaper to detect and stop processes that are no longer required. Moses-
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Mounter performs data isolation by using directory polyinstantiation [49], which al-
lows to mount a directory as different instances based on some parameters. Finally,
in order to change between security profiles, MOSES offers MosesSpChanger and
MosesPolicyGui.
The researchers have evaluated MOSES using a Google Nexus S phone, an An-
droid device. They did not find significant overhead for battery consumption and
storage. In terms of overhead produced by security enforcement, MOSES is much
less efficient compared to TaintDroid. For microbenchmarking, MOSES has an infe-
rior performance than a stock Android, but a comparable performance to TaintDroid.
The authors of MOSES have noticed a series of deficiencies in their framework.
For example, if an application obtains root access, then it can bypass MOSES security
enforcement. Additionally, this architecture does not provide isolation for SD cards.
Further, MOSES has only been developed for Android platforms, leaving iOS without
an implementation.
MOSES offers space isolation, data protection and policy enforcement by design.
However, it does not provide true isolation, as the corporate space is still located on
the mobile phone. Further, this solution is resource intensive as it implements par-
avirtualization on the mobile devices, and it results intrusive to the user as modified
Android software must be installed on the BYOD device.
3.6 Framework
The solutions presented so far focus on addressing specific issues related to the chal-
lenges in BYOD environments. Frameworks, however, are composed by a set of the
previous solutions. The final purpose of a framework is to provide a global and inte-
grated solution that covers all the goals for a secure BYOD environment. Frameworks
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are alternatives that present a complex architecture, as they have components on both
the BYOD device as well as at the corporate network. We can classify frameworks
based on their origin in research-based or commercial alternatives.
3.6.1 Research-based Solutions
These solutions are found in the research community. Generally, they are not devel-
oped by any commercial company. We describe research-based solutions as follows.
3.6.1.1 2-Tier Access Control (2TAC)
Chung et al. [121] propose 2TAC, a distributed access control architecture for BYOD.
The goal of this architecture is to solve the trust issues related to BYOD devices
that access critical information in an enterprise. The researchers identify two main
roadblocks that must be addressed in order to have a secure mobile device and an
appropriate access control: (1) new malware and sophisticated attacks are released
constantly, and (2) mobile devices are pieces of hardware with limited battery life.
According to the authors, 2TAC is a framework that uses different concepts such
as social networking, tagging system, malware-scanning using the Cloud, Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) systems that leverage the Cloud and virtualized security
profile for mobile devices. The architecture of 2TAC consists on the Device Control
Tier located at the mobile device, and the Cloud Control Tier located on the Cloud.
First, the Device Control Tier includes a profile virtualization that allows the de-
vice only to run certain tasks in function of the location and the time by specifying per-
missions, settings, applications, resources, as well as how often the malware-scanning
is performed; and a light anti-malware software which only scans fundamental parts
of the device, such as the kernel or the file system. This anti-malware can be also
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started by the user or the administrator at any point.
Second, the Cloud Control tier performs all the management capabilities and
it contains a profile management system, multiple anti-malware software scanners,
access to user’s logs and a trust management system. The profile management system
offers the possibility of create, modify and delete multiple profiles to be used on the
BYOD devices. Once a mobile device tries to access data, two tests are performed:
first the device is analyzed to know if it has the proper profile and then the device
is checked against the trust management system. The anti-malware software at the
Cloud is more complex than the one on the mobile device, which let the system
perform extensive analysis without considering the consumption of resources. Just
like the light anti-malware, the cloud version can be run on-demand or on a schedule
basis. In order to perform the analysis on the Cloud, a snapshot of the processes,
applications and data is sent from the mobile device to the Cloud. The access record
component is a set of logs containing information such as when, where and how devices
accessed the corporate data. These logs can be used to determine when a mobile
device has been lost or stolen based on the location of the device. Finally, the trust
management system is in charge of data access and social network by implementing
the use of tags on devices and corporate data. Tags contain information related to the
user that modified a set of data, as well as how and when it was modified. According
to the users, the implementation of this system is to eliminate the threat of a single
point of failure by implementing this task in a distributed fashion. The social aspect of
this implementation is achieved by introducing tags that are associated with different
departments in the enterprise.
When it comes to security policies, 2TAC provides a flexible policy management
by defining the type of access based on the enterprise’s needs. However, the authors
suggest four straightforward types of profiles that can be implemented using this
55
framework: untrusted user, basic user, advanced user, and super user. The difference
between these types of profiles is the knowledge on security they demonstrate and
how often the security scanning must be performed on their devices, and on the type
of access they are granted through the corporate network.
According to their publication, the authors state that an implementation of 2TAC
is planned as future work. This implementation will use Android for the mobile
devices and Amazon Web Services as the cloud provider.
2TAC clearly provides policy enforcement and it is not resource-intensive to the
user, as most of the scans are performed on the Cloud. Additionally, some degree of
separation of spaces is offered through the use of profiles. Despite of this, 2TAC does
not implement true space isolation because both the personal data and the corporate
data reside at the mobile device all the time. Further, no cryptographic algorithms
are used in order to maintain the corporate information protected. Finally, the fact
that the device does not have space for the personal space means that the data and
the applications of the user can be analyzed by the enterprise.
3.6.1.2 BYOD Security Framework (BSF)
Wang et al. [23] present another security framework for BYOD environments. Due
to the fact that RMS is based on this framework, we provide a full description in
Section 4.1.
3.6.1.3 Security Service Architecture (SSA)
Titze et al. [122] address the problem of mobile applications that do not comply
with the corporate security policies. According to the researchers, marketplaces such
as Google Play provide mechanisms to detect malware before they are downloaded
and installed. However, in BYOD environments relying on the mobile application
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marketplace can lead to security risks, since the enterprise cannot determine which
requirements have been used by the marketplace to authorize or reject the mobile
application. Moreover, even if these requirements are known, the enterprise must be
able to define which requirements are needed according to its needs, instead of fully
relying on the requirements decided by a third-party.
First, one of the main claims of the authors address the issues related to Google
Play and Apple’s App Store. In the former, the applications are uploaded, then
analyzed and finally they are available to the users. However Google does not detail
how malware is detected. The latter has a review process but no information on how
this process works. Additionally, both marketplaces only have access to the binary
files, without analyzing the source code of the mobile applications.
Second, the authors describe the techniques used to detect malware in mobile
applications, being Android the most tested platform. However, they state that all
the approaches for malware detection require modifications on the mobile device,
which might void the manufacturer’s guarantee.
SSA provides an infrastructure that allows the enterprise to apply malware de-
tection techniques at the corporate network, independently of the marketplace from
where mobile applications are obtained. This enables the enterprise to leverage the
control on the mobile device by implementing the requirements they need in order to
prevent insecure BYOD environments. To achieve this, the physical device is repli-
cated and a virtual copy of it is obtained. This virtual copy is then sent to the
corporate infrastructure. This replication includes the kernel, the device drivers, the
user-space executable files, and all configuration files. Once the copy has arrived,
the mobile device image is run in a software emulation and it is checked for security
compliance, using the corporate security policies. During this testing, the authors
state that both autonomous execution and triggered execution must be performed.
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While the former type of execution does not require the input from the user, the
latter does. Malware detection is then performed. The authors note that, depending
on the malware detection technique, the virtual device might be changed in order to
accommodate the needs of the technique. We must point out that this concept of
recording and then replaying for mobile devices has been introduced by Portokalidis
et al. [123].
Once all the testing has been finished, SSA provides different outcomes. First, it
offers a passive outcome by notifying the user or the administrators about the results
of the scan. Second, this framework allows active responses, which can either reset
the phone to an uninfected state using an image stored at the corporate network, or
by lowering the privileges of the device and preventing it from access sensitive data.
Titze et al. [122] recognize the limitations of this architecture. First, since the
emulation cannot replicate the configuration of all mobile devices available in the
market, the framework can only support a finite number of them (for example, some
hardware characteristics such as finger print reader could not be supported). Second,
the current implementation of SSA records the interaction of the user with applica-
tions, limiting the tests to mobile applications that were actually executed by the
user. Additionally, the fact that user input is recorded leads to privacy concerns.
Third, the malware detection technique used must be compatible with the emulation
software, limiting the number of the techniques that can be used, or increasing the
number of emulation that must be performed for each mobile device.
SSA is a solution that does not provide any form of space isolation, as the user’s
space is not separated from the corporate space. Corporate data protection is also
not offered, since no encryption mechanism is found. Additionally, this framework
might result intrusive to the user, as it records its behavior on the entire mobile
device. However, SSA provides policy enforcement by analyzing the applications and
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configuration on the mobile device. Further, it is not resource-intensive, as all the
testing is performed in a emulated device located in the corporate infrastructure.
3.6.2 Commercial Solutions
In the previous section we have described framework solutions that have been pro-
posed by the research community. Now we focus on frameworks that are commercial
products These types of solutions are available in the market and are offered by
well-known companies.
3.6.2.1 Cisco BYOD Smart Solution
Cisco’s solution for BYOD environment [113] [124] is a set of network elements that
provide the necessary infrastructure for providing a secure way to access the corporate
network from the mobile devices. As a result, Cisco offers a modular and flexible
architecture that adapts to the enterprise’s needs.
First, Cisco provides solutions for wireless connectivity through the implementa-
tion of their connectivity products such as routers and wireless access points. These
network infrastructures can further be managed with Cisco Prime Infrastructure Man-
agement software. Second, this BYOD solution provides policy management through
the use of Cisco Identity Services Engine, which enables authorization, authentica-
tion. This engine also offers access policies based on the user’s identification and the
mobile device. Additionally, this system provides management tools to visualize who
and what devices are accessing the wireless and VPN networks. Third, as mentioned
before, Cisco offers AnyConnect, which provides a secure VPN access to the corporate
network from other, untrusted networks. Finally, although Cisco does not provide
any MDM solution, it can be integrated with third-party products.
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By allowing the use of a third-party MDM, Cisco can leverage the enforcement of
security policies. However, this also makes the solution intrusive to the user. Cisco
BYOD Smart Solution does not offer any type of corporate data protection, as the
use of cryptographic protocols is not provided to the mobile device. Further, space
isolation is not achieved since this framework does not require any type of container-
ization on the BYOD device. Finally, this solution allows the implementation of this
infrastructure without demanding any further resource from the mobile device.
3.6.2.2 Samsung KNOX
Samsung KNOX [125] [126] is a solution that includes enhanced security, container
mechanisms, a cloud-based enterprise mobility management service, and a market-
place. This enhanced security is achieved with a trusted boot that guarantees that
only verified and authorized applications can run on the mobile device. Additionally,
Samsung KNOX relies on ARM TrustZone-based Integrity Measurement Architec-
ture which checks the integrity of the Linux Kernel used in Android devices. Further,
Samsung’s solution provides Security Enhancement for Android which includes an
additional third-party container.
Data isolation is provided by the implementation of containers. These containers
are realized by developing secure zones on the mobile device for corporate application
and by encrypting corporate data. First, IPSec and VPN are used for the cases where
the data is transferred. Second, 256-bit AES is used when the data is stored, either in
the internal memory or in SD cards. Additionally, communication between these two
spaces can be controlled with the use of security policies. Samsung KNOX hypervisor
is provided by INTEGRITY Multivisor technology [127].
The MDM solution that Samsung KNOX offers is part of a product called Samsung
KNOX EEM, which is an alternative that works on the Cloud. This means that the
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enterprise does not need to deploy any additional infrastructure in order to manage
the user’s devices. However, Samsung KNOX can be integrated with other MDM
solutions such as AirWatch, Citrix, and SAP [128]. to enable the implementation of
security policies.
Finally, since some applications can be insecure even if they are downloaded from
a trusted marketplace, Samsung KNOX provides its own marketplace that guarantees
the security of the mobile applications listed in it.
As any commercial product, Samsung KNOX has received certifications from ex-
ternal enterprises. The list of these certifications include The Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, FIPS 140-2 Certification by the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology, and DISA MOS SRG Compliance from
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), which is part of the Department of
Defense of the United States of America.
The big disadvantage of this framework is that all the features are not available to
all mobile devices. This means that, in order fully take advantage of the benefits that
this solution offer, the user must own not only a Samsung device, but also a specific
model from this company (generally the high-end devices from the Samsung galaxy
line). While MDM features are compatible with iOS and non-Samsung Android, the
marketplace, the container and the enhanced security are not available to iOS or
Android devices from other brands.
Samsung KNOX achieves different goals for a secure BYOD environment. It of-
fers space isolation by separating the personal space from the corporate space using
containers. It provides corporate data security by implementing cryptographic prim-
itives, even though it is not available to all mobile devices. Samsung KNOX provides
policy enforcement by allowing integration with its own EEM or with a third-party
MDM. As the containers are built-in on the Samsung devices, no extra resources
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are needed and this solution is not resource-intensive. However, since it implements
MDM capabilities on the mobile device, it results intrusive to the user. Further,
personal data and corporate data are still stored on the mobile device, meaning that
true isolation cannot be achieved.
3.7 Comparison of Solutions
We summarize all the solutions for securing BYOD environments in Tables 3.3 and
3.4. These tables includes all the solutions described in this chapter, their type, the
goals they achieve, as well as their compatibility with Android and iOS OSes.
First, none of the solutions can satisfy all the goals. Moreover, solutions that
share a type generally also address the same goals. Second, solutions that come from
the research community only support Android, while commercial solutions provide
support to both iOS and Android. Finally, most of the frameworks that come from
the research community are not available to the enterprises.
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Solution Type
INTEGRITY Multivisor [31] MVM/FV 3 3 3
VMWare Horizon [33] MVM/HD 3 3 3
L4Android [36], Cells [28] MVM/L 3 3 3
AirWatch by VMware [40],
Amtel MDM [41] [42] [43],
BlackBerry BES10 [44], CA
MDM [45], Citrix XenMobile
Device Management [46] [47],
Dell EMM [48], Good MDM
[49] [50], IBM MaaS360 [51]
[52], McAfee EMM [53], Mi-
crosoft Intune [54] [55], Mobile-
Iron EMM [56] [57] [58], SAP
Afaria [59] [60], SOTI Mobi-
Control [61], Symantec Mobile
Management [62]
AB/MDM 3 3 3 3 3
Table 3.3: Comparison between the different type of solutions based on their type,
goals they achieve and support for mobile OSes. MVM represents Mobile Virtual
Machine, FV represents Full Virtualization, HD represents Heavy Duty, L represents
Lightweight, AB represents Agent-based, and MDM represents Mobile Device Man-
agement.
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box [87], Dropbox [88],
Google Drive [89], iCloud
[90], OneDrive [91]
CB/C 3 3 3 3 3
L2TP/IPSec [102] [103], PPTP
[107] VPN/S 3 3 3 3
Cisco IPSec [112], Cisco Any-
Connect [113], Juniper Junos
Pulse [114]
VPN/C 3 3 3 3
TEE [115] TE 3 3 3 3 3
TrustDroid [118] TE 3 3
MOSES [119] TE 3 3 3 3
2TAC [121] F/R 3 3 3 3
BYOD Security Framework
[23]
F/R 3 3 3
SSA [122] F/R 3 3
Cisco BYOD Smart Solution
[113] [124] F/C 3 3 3 3 3
Samsung KNOX [125] [126] F/C 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table 3.4: Comparison between the different type of solutions based on their type,
goals they achieve and support to mobile OSes (contd.). CB represents Cloud-based,
C represents Commercial, VPN represents Virtual Private Network, S represents Stan-
dard, TE represents Trusted Environment, F represents Framework, R represents
Research.
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As mentioned earlier, none of the solutions presented in this chapter achieve the
necessary solutions for a secure BYOD environment. In the following chapter, we
introduce Remote Mobile Screen (RMS), a framework that achieves all the necessary
goals for a secure BYOD environment.
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Chapter 4
Remote Mobile Screen (RMS):
Description and Experiments
Before we present our solution, Remote Mobile Screen (RMS), we start by describing
BSF a framework solution, which is related to our work. Then, we provide a discussion
on how RMS achieves all the goals for a secure BYOD environment. We provide the
steps needed for a session initiation and termination. We analyze the features and
challenges that RMS presents. Then, we describe an implementation of our framework
that uses commonly available software. We perform a security analysis and identify
security threats related to our solution. Further, we provide a security analysis of
the architecture. Finally, we provide experimental results in order to address a set of
these challenges.
4.1 BYOD Security Framework (BSF)
As mentioned in section 3.6.1.2, BSF is a framework presented by Wang et al. [23].
This framework has been designed to achieve three goals. First, space isolation is
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required so that the personal space and the corporate space become separated from
each other, and allow policies to be implemented for each of them individually. Sec-
ond, corporate data protection is needed so that unauthorized access to this data
becomes unfeasible, which is achieved by encrypting all the corporate data stored on
the BYOD device. Lastly, security policy enforcement must be implemented so that
the devices comply with the enterprise’s requirements.
In order to meet these three requirements, BSF defines two entities: the enterprise
side and the device side. The former is composed by all the corporate resources such
as enterprise’s servers, gateways to the Internet and the corporate data. In this side
a Network Access Control (NAC) mechanism is in charge of providing access control
when the BYOD devices try to access these resources. This access is either authorized
or rejected based on the corporate policies. Additionally, the NAC has to differentiate
between the requests from the personal space and the requests from the corporate
space, which is achieved by implementing certificates for each of them. In order to
manage the corporate policies a security policy database is deployed. These policies
include information on how to handle the access request when it comes from a user
space on a BYOD device, which devices are allowed to access the network, as well as
the parameters of the connection. Finally, mobile devices are managed by integrating
an MDM solution, which relies on the policy database and enforces these policies on
the BYOD devices. Figure 4.1 shows a representation of all the components found in
BSF.
At the device side, we can find space isolation between the personal space and
the corporate space. Consequently, the personal space contains all the mobile appli-
cations and data owned by the employee, while the corporate space has the mobile
applications and information needed by the enterprise. Since the corporate space
must comply with the security policies of the enterprise, an MDM agent is installed
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Figure 4.1: BSF architecture (based on [23]).
in this space, which provides the administrators management capabilities on the mo-
bile device. Further, a security policy enforcement entity is also part of this space.
These policies are stored in this space through the implementation of a security pol-
icy database. Finally, corporate data protection is achieved by implementing crypto-
graphic algorithms as well as access mechanisms in order to prevent the data to be
copied without proper authorization.
As defined by its own goals, BSF achieves corporate data protection by implement-
ing cryptographic primitives and controlling the access to the information located at
corporate space. It also supports security policy enforcement due to the use of MDM
and security policy databases and enforcers. Finally, space isolation is achieved by
separating the personal space from the corporate space. However, true space isolation
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cannot be offered, as the corporate data is still stored on the mobile device. Further,
in order to provide policy enforcement, BSF installs an agent that can become intru-
sive to the employee. Finally, space isolation is achieved using MVMs, but this could
lead to a resource intensive solution.
4.2 Architecture presented by RMS
RMS modifies the BSF’s architecture [23] by moving the corporate space located in
the mobile device to the enterprise network. Additionally, RMS adds a new compo-
nent that we denoted Corporate Space Manager, which is used to manage the access
to mobile virtual machines located in the enterprise network. Finally, RMS uses the
Virtual Network Computing (VNC) protocol (which is in turn based on the Remote
Framebuffer (RFB) protocol [129]) to allow the user to access his or her proper cor-
porate space. Just as in BSF [23], RMS presents a BYOD side and an enterprise side,
which are described as follows.
4.2.1 BYOD side
Compared to the BSF [23], this part of the architecture is simpler. The mobile device
only contains the employee’s personal space. This means that the device cannot
include any component with the exception of the personal data and applications of
the employee. Consequently, there is no need to install either an MVM or an MDM
agent on the mobile device. The only requirement of our framework is that VNC
client application must be installed in the BYOD side. This client is used by the
employee to access the enterprise space located at the corporate network. Part (A)
of Figure 4.2 shows the BYOD side with all the mentioned components.
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The novelty of our architecture relies on the way the employee access the corporate
resources. In order to access these resources, the employee must install and use a VNC
client from an app store such as Apple’s App Store, Google’s Play Store, or an app
store provided by the enterprise. Then, the user does not access a desktop OS (i.e.
Windows, Linux, Mac OS X), but he or she is presented with a mobile OS (i.e.
Android, iOS). This requirement addresses the poor level of usability that desktop
OSes have when they are accessed from a mobile device.
Desktop OSes are not designed to be scaled to the small screens that mobile
devices present, since the graphical interface and desktop applications are developed
for bigger screens. Further, desktop OSes do not implement gestures (e.g. pinch-to-
zoom, swipe, etc.) nor the type of input (i.e. finger or stylus) customary to a mobile
OSes. Consequently, when the employee accesses the enterprise side, he or she is
presented with an interface designed for a mobile device. To our understanding, the
concept of a mobile device that access a mobile OS over a network has not been used
in BYOD environments, or for any other kind of purpose.
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Figure 4.2: RMS architecture.
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4.2.2 Enterprise Side
This side is composed of most of the elements needed in the RMS architecture. This
is because the enterprise side does not suffer from the limitations in terms of resources
that a mobile device has. As a consequence, in the enterprise side we can find the
Corporate Resources, a Network Access Control, a Security Policy Database, an MDM
server, Corporate Spaces and the Corporate Space Manager. The enterprise side, as
well as its components, is depicted in Part (B) of Figure 4.2
The corporate resources are composed by devices and services such as e-mail
servers, web servers, gateways to the Internet, or any proprietary application that
the enterprise has. The Network Access Control is in charge of authenticating valid
employees and authorizing them to access the enterprise resources. The Network
Access Control not only analyzes requests from outside of the enterprise network,
but also evaluates the requests that come from inside of the enterprise network. The
Security Policy Database stores all the policy definitions that the enterprise has. In
order to grant or reject access, the Network Access Control relies on the security
policies that the Security Policy Database contains. The MDM server is in charge of
enforcing all the security policies on the Corporate Spaces.
At the enterprise side we find the corporate space, which contains all the corporate
data and applications that the employees needs for working. We can define this space
as a VM provided with a mobile OS. Consequently, the enterprise side contains a
server running a VM software that deploys several corporate spaces in the form of
guest OSes. Each of these corporate spaces is assigned to one employee only. Further,
each of the mobile OSes has installed a VNC server, which is configured in such a
way that the employee can access his or her corporate space using the VNC client
found in his or her BYOD device. In addition, each corporate space is provided with
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an MDM agent, which is in charge of implementing the security policies enforced by
the MDM server.
The Corporate Space Manager is in charge of administrating all the corporate
spaces in the enterprise network. This manager is able to create, delete, start, pause,
resume and stop the VMs in the VM server, providing elasticity to the architecture.
The Corporate Space Manager operates as a proxy server, since it inspects the content
of VNC packets and performs actions based on such content. In order to decide
whether to create, start or resume an existing VM, the Corporate Space Manager
must keep track of which VM is assigned to each user. Further, it is also in charge
of setting the networking configuration of the VM, as well as adding and removing
Network Address Translation (NAT) entries in the VM software so that the employees’
requests get forwarded to the corresponding VM.
Further, the Corporate Space Manager can be implemented as a centralized entity
or deployed as a set of geographically distributed instances, based on the needs of the
enterprise. This second configuration is particular beneficial in large-scale enterprises.
The advantages of a distributed network is that a Corporate Space Manager can be
deployed closer to the employees thus reducing the latency in the communication. We
discuss issues related to latency in Sections 4.7.8 and 4.8.3. Deploying a distributed
network implies solving problems similar to the ones found in Content Distributed
Networks such as the Object Replication Problem, and the Request Routing Problem
[130]. However, we must point out that in the case of RMS, the employee is not just
accessing content, but also modifying such data.
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4.3 Session Initiation and Termination
RMS offers the employee access the to corporate resources just as if he or she were
using an MVM installed in the BYOD device, but without affecting its resources.
Following, we present how an employee accesses his or her corporate space.
When an employee wants to access his or her corporate space, the VNC client is
started in the BYOD device, and a connection to the enterprise network is requested
to the Network Access Control. The Network Access Control then authenticates
the employee using a combination of username and password and forwards the VNC
connection request to the Corporate Space Manager. The manager checks the status
of the VM assigned to the employee. If the VM does not exist, the manager creates
it; if the VM is stopped, the manager starts it; If the VM is paused, the manager
resumes it. Then, the Corporate Space Manager sets up the NAT entries and forwards
the VNC connection to the VM. Once the VNC connection request reaches the VNC
server, the session can be established.
After the session has been established, the VNC client application is in charge of
sending the gestures input at the BYOD device to the VNC server in the corporate
space. Further, the VNC client is in charge of obtaining screen images from the VM
and presenting them to the employee using the screen on the BYOD device. For
example, if the employee taps on an application in the corporate space, the VNC
client sends the tap to the VNC server and requests a new screen image. Then, the
user is presented with the image of the application he or she wanted to use.
Finally, once the employee wants to finish the connection to the corporate space,
he or she closes the VNC client in the BYOD device. The VNC protocol is a stateless
protocol, and no VNC message is sent to the corporate network. However, since VNC
run on top of TCP, the Corporate Space Manager can detect the session teardown,
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then remove the NAT entry and finally pause the proper VM. In the case of a re-
connection the VM can be resumed from a paused status, and the employee can
continue using the VM from the point where he or she left it previously.
4.4 Features Offered by RMS
RMS achieves all the desired goals for a secure BYOD environment. It provides
separation of spaces by implementing the corporate space in the enterprise network
while leaving the personal space at the mobile device. This way, the enterprise can
only focus on enforcing security policies in the corporate space.
The way the corporate space and the personal space are separated achieves the
goal of true isolation, since both spaces are never shared either in the BYOD device
or in the VM. Even if the BYOD device gets lost of stolen, the corporate space is not
compromised because no enterprise data is stored in the mobile device.
This isolation of the data also guarantees data protection, as the corporate data
remains always in the enterprise network. Further, VMs offer containers that separate
the corporate spaces of different users. This prevents data leakage between corporate
spaces. Additionally, the implementation of the Network Access Control and the
Corporate Space Manager provides a strict control of the information’s flow between
personal and corporate spaces.
RMS implements an MDM agent in the corporate space of each employee. This,
along with a MDM server, allows the enterprise to enforce security policies. For
example, instead of installing applications from the Internet in the guest OS, the
employee is offered a curated, authorized list of applications allowed by the company.
Furthermore, the enterprise can decide which permissions an employee can have in
the corporate space. RMS offers and additional advantage because all the security
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efforts are concentrated on a single point in the corporate network, instead of focusing
the security efforts on every mobile device.
The proposed framework is not intrusive to the employee because the BYOD side
does not require any application with administrative or root privileges as an MDM
agent might request. Further the personal space cannot be controlled or monitored
by the enterprise since the latter does not establish any type of communication with
the mobile device. In addition, the enterprise does not need to provide support to
the BYOD at all, since there is no software installed by the corporation.
In order to provide space isolation, a VM has been implemented at the corporate
network. This type of solutions are resource demanding and the performance of
mobile devices can be negatively affected. RMS benefits from the fact that the VM
is not deployed on the BYOD device in order to achieve the goal of low resource
consumption. Further, the employee does not need to allocate storage space on his
or her device for the corporate data and work-related applications.
Another benefit of this framework is the fact that it is platform-agnostic, as it
can provide service to every mobile platform that has a VNC client application.
For example, RealVNC is available on Android, Blackberry, iPhone, Symbian and
Windows Mobile platforms [131]. Further, since only a VNC client is needed, BYOD
devices can be changed by the employees without consulting the enterprise. This
provides flexibility and deals with the fast high frequency of obsolescence in an efficient
way.
Finally, the enterprise can avoid OS fragmentation by implementing RMS, as the
enterprise can decide to deploy a specific version of a mobile OS in each of the VMs.
Consequently, it becomes easier to provide support to the VMs, as they are similar.
Moreover, enterprise does not need to consider the situations where one productivity
software is available for some versions of an OS, but unavailable to others.
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4.5 Implementation
We developed a proof-of-concept implementation with commonly available software.
First, in order to deploy the mobile OS we used different type of servers running
either Linux or Mac OS X. The VM software installed in these servers was Oracle’s
VirtualBox [132], which is an open-source virtualization software.
In order to realize the corporate space, we deployed AndroVM [133] and Android-
86 [134] as guest OSes. AndroVM is an open-source implementation of Android
for the x86 architecture that is distributed in VirtualBox-compatible files, known as
.ova files. This feature makes AndroVM easier to deploy. However, AndroVM was
developed in such a way that the boot configuration of the operating system is located
in a partition that cannot be directly modified by the user, which makes harder any
form of special configuration. Android-x86 can be modified with less restrictions. For
example, the screen resolution of the mobile OS can be easily re-sized. Android-x86,
nevertheless, is harder to deploy as it is distributed as a live CD that must be then
installed on the VM. It is important to note that there are no iOS implementations
that run on VirtualBox for two reasons: first, it violates the iOS’s Software License
Agreement [27] and second, there is no port of iOS to the x86 architecture.
The VNC server used is Droid VNC server [135] but modified for the x86 archi-
tecture, as the one available for the ARM architecture presents issues for binding
the ports at the guest OS. Droid VNC Server is open-source and presents features
such as password authentication, rotate/scale, and clipboard support. One of the
requirements for Droid VNC Server to work is root privilege on the device.
Finally, for VNC clients, we have employed the free versions of Mocha VNC Lite
[136], VNC Viewer [137] and VNC Client - Universal App [138] for iOS, Mocha VNC
Lite for Android [139], and TinyVNC [140] for Windows Phone. In all these VNC
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clients we have found that, since they are not designed for accessing a mobile OS on
the server side, they lack features such as pinch-to-zoom and swipe. Moreover, every
time pinch-to-zoom is issued, the VNC clients zooms the image gotten from the VNC
server. Further, swipe gestures lead to move the image displayed at the client.
Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show our implementation. In these figures we can see three
mobile devices running at the left side of each picture and three virtual machines
running the corporate space at the right side of each picture. In Figure 4.3, Android-
x86 is displayed on the screen of an Apple iPhone 5s running iOS 8 and Mocha VNC
Lite as a client. In Figure 4.4, an Apple iPad Mini running iOS 8 and Mocha VNC
Lite access an instance of Android-x86. Finally, in Figure 4.5, AndroVM is used as
the corporate space for a Samsung Focus with Windows Phone 7 running TinyVNC
as a client.
Figure 4.3: Implementation using an Apple iPhone 5S accessing Android-x86 as cor-
porate space.
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Figure 4.4: Implementation using an Apple iPad Mini accessing Android-x86 as cor-
porate space.
Figure 4.5: Implementation using a Samung Focus accessing AndroVM as corporate
space.
4.6 Security Analysis
We have identified a set of threats that might affect the security of our framework.
Firstly, the RFB (and consequently VNC) protocol lacks an acceptable level of se-
curity. Therefore, the goal of Corporate Data Protection cannot be guaranteed.
Richardson et. al. [129] state that this protocols only offers a cryptographically weak
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password authentication mechanism, and it does not provide any form of protection
against passive or active attacks. In order to overcome this issue, the researches men-
tion that any RFB connection must be set up on top of a VPN connection, such as
the one that SSH and IPSec provide.
Secondly, the RFB protocol allows sharing the clipboard and files between the
client and the server. Generally, this characteristic would be considered a feature, but
in our framework this might prevent space isolation between the personal space and
the corporate space. Consequently they threat the goals of Space Isolation and True
Space Isolation. Disabling both features from the server side can prevent this threat.
This way, both clipboards are confined to their respective spaces and file-sharing is
not allowed. Another approach is to enable the flow of information between spaces
only in one direction. For example, an employee can only upload files to the server,
or send information from the client’s clipboard to the server’s clipboard. In this
situation the employee cannot download files from the corporate space, nor obtain
the information from the clipboard at the corporate space.
Thirdly, there might be situations where the content of the screen of the BYOD
device is captured, for example by taking screenshots of the device’s screen or when
an attacker looks over the shoulder of an employee to see the content of the mobile
device (i. e. shoulder surfing). While taking screenshots might affect the goals of
Corporate Data Protection and Space Isolation, shoulder surfing only affects the goal
of Corporate Data Protection. There is no technological solution to prevent these
situations, other than privacy and screen protectors against shoulder surfing. Since
the company does not have any software installed in the mobile device that could
prevent screenshots, the only alternative against this threat is employee education,
where the employee learns about the different threats that put the corporate infor-
mation at risk, and the precautions that must be taken in order to mitigate these
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threats.
Lastly, Denial of Service is an important threat that targets the corporate network.
In this type of attack, the corporate resources are requested to perform a high volume
of tasks (either processing or networking) such that the performance of the services
get degraded or completely interrupted. Consequently, employees cannot access their
corporate spaces and cannot work properly. These problems are addressed by using
redundancy of single points of failures and backing up data. For RMS, the Network
Access Control and the Corporate Space Manager must present a fail-over system,
and the VMs must be frequently backed up.
4.7 Challenges Presented by RMS
Our framework presents a series of challenges that must be addressed. We identify
these challenges and discuss how they affect RMS.
4.7.1 Connectivity
In order to access the corporate network, each employee must have access to a network
such that he or she is able to establish a connection to the enterprise network. This
requirement is part of the trade-off that RMS creates in order to achieve all the goals
needed for a secure BYOD environment. Consequently, the mobile device heavily
relies on continuous connectivity. Without a connection the employee is not able to
perform work-related actions such as sending and receiving work-related emails.
However, we consider that given the high level of connectivity found in mobile
devices (either cellular networks or WiFi), the employees should not have issues when
it comes to accessing the corporate network.
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4.7.2 Android and the x86 architecture
Android is an operating system developed and optimized for the ARM architecture
[141]. Since the servers we used do not present an ARM architecture but an x86
architecture, the virtualization software also offers an x86 architecture to the guest
OSes. Consequently, the version of Android used in our implementation must be
compatible with the x86 architecture.
In our research, we have found and tested three implementations of Android for
the x86 architecture: AndroVM [133], Genymotion [142] and Android-x86 [134]. The
first one is an open-source implementation that was later merged into Genymotion
and it is no longer available. Genymotion is also an open-source implementation that
presents additional features to the ones that AndroVM presents. The goal of both
AndroVM and Genymotion is to provide a efficient testing framework for application
development. Finally, Android-x86 is an open-source port of Android to the x86
architecture. The goal of the community that develops Android-x86 is simply to
support the mobile OS on different x86 platforms. On the one hand, in our testing
both AndroVM and Android-x86 proven to work with VirtualBox. On the other
hand, Genymotion implementations presented issues once the mobile OS were run
from the VirtualBox console instead of using the manager provided by Genymotion.
4.7.3 Usability
RMS presents a series of drawbacks when it comes to usability mainly based on the
adoption of RFB. This protocol considers two main events: input events (ie˙. clicks)
and output events (ie˙. screen images). Even though RFB has been updated over the
time to support new input events such as scroll-wheel events, the protocol has not
been designed nor updated for the mobile devices, and it lacks support for gestures
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that are customary in such devices. Further, as mentioned before, VNC clients do not
use these gestures at the mobile device in a proper way. For example, if a user tries
to scroll the content of a web page, the client will interpret that the user is trying to
access parts of the screen that are not shown and move the image received from the
server out of the screen bounds.
In order to overcome this issue, we propose three alternatives. The first one is to
extend the RFB protocol in order to include these new types of input events. Under
this situation, the VNC Server and the VNC clients must be also updated to support
these features and they must implement gestures such as swipe and pinch-to-zoom
properly.
The second alternative is to migrate from the RFB protocol to another protocol
such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) [143], a proprietary protocol developed by
Microsoft, which provides extensions to the ITU T.120 family of protocol. According
to Microsoft, this protocol implement touch gestures [144]. In our research we did
not find any RDP server for Android. VirtualBox, however, supports a VirtualBox
Remote Desktop Protocol that can be installed as part of the extension pack. The im-
plementation of this protocol involves the adoption of RDP clients by the employees.
Finally, the fact that this protocol is proprietary may discourage some enterprises to
use it.
The final option is to consider that the RFB protocol presents enough drawbacks
as an argument for completely avoiding it use. Consequently, a new and modern com-
munication protocol could be developed considering all the features that are missing
in RFB as well as other features that could be leveraged for RMS. In the list of
features we can include touch gestures, security for both passive and active attacks,
implementation of notifications from the applications in the corporate space to the
BYOD device. In this scenario, not only the communication protocol would have to
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be developed, but also a server and clients for each of the mobile platforms.
4.7.4 Video Playback
It results impractical to watch videos over VNC for two reasons: first, there is no
audio available; and second, the refresh rate of VNC is not fast enough to present
continuity in the video playback. We have tried different encoding standards for
VNC and we can see an increment in the refresh rate. However, the refresh rate of
the images is not fast enough for a seamless video playback.
However, we can find research on improving the frame rate of the VNC protocol.
For example, Tan-Atichat et al. [145] shows that up to 14 frames per second can be
achieved in environments with 500 milliseconds of latency. Even though this is a good
improvement, smooth video playback requires between 24 and 30 frames per second.
4.7.5 Malware
Threats related to malware must be considered for both the personal space and the
corporate space. First, since the enterprise does not have any control over the BYOD
device, it cannot enforce the use of an antivirus application for the personal space.
The enterprise, however, can educate the employee about the risks related to malware
and explain the consequences of malicious software. Moreover, since the framework
presents a Network Access Control, malware attacks to the corporate network can be
mitigated.
Second, at the corporate space the enterprise has full control over it. Consequently,
it can install any antivirus software for mobile devices, and it can enforce policies that
prevent the employee from remove or stop the antivirus.
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4.7.6 Compatibility
Android provides a Dalvik register-based VM, which is based on Java [146]. This way
there is an abstraction layer between the Android kernel and the mobile applications.
Even though Android is mainly developed for the ARM architecture, the use of a VM
provides portability, as mobile applications can be ported to other implementation of
Android running on different architecture.
For RMS, the use of the Dalvik VM should provide sufficient compatibility such
that applications from Google Play can be seamlessly installed in an x86-version
of Android. Nevertheless, Google also offers an NDK [147] which takes advantage of
native libraries offered for ARM, x86 and MIPS architecture, offer better performance
and allow the development of applications in C and C++. Since most of the mobile
devices are implement an ARM processor, it becomes clear that applications that
need better performance will use native libraries for the ARM architecture. As a
consequence, the compatibility of application can be broken when they are installed
on the x86 architecture.
According to Choi et al. [148] around 75% of the applications found in Google Play
do not present any native ARM code. However, the remaining 25% must be addressed.
In order to overcome this situation, Intel released a binary translation library called
Houdini [148], which allows applications compiled for the ARM architecture to run on
x86 architectures. On the one hand, the distributions of AndroVM and Android-x86
include this library. Genymotion, on the other hand, does not include this library
and it must be installed separately.
In section 4.8.1, we address this concern by carrying out a survey on the produc-
tivity applications available in Google Play for each of AndroVM, Android-x86 and
Genymotion.
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4.7.7 Scalability
The framework we propose only allows one employee per VM, as each employee needs
one mobile OS running in the enterprise network. This means that each VM requests
resources from the VM server that cannot be used by other purpose. Consequently,
there might be concerns regarding the scalability of the RMS framework. In this
section we discuss them and propose solutions to decrease the resources needed by
this framework. Later, in section 4.8.2, we provide the results of scalability tests that
were performed on RMS.
Once a new VM is created a list of available resources (e.g. RAM memory, hard
disk capacity, video memory) must be set. For example, AndroVM requires 1024MB
of RAM, three hard drives of 541MB, 5.51GB and 8.00GB and 8MB of video memory.
However, these resources are the limit these virtual devices can use, meaning that
when they run, they do not use all the allocated resources and leave them available so
that the server can allocate them to other VMs or other processes. As a consequence,
a server is able to run more VMs than initially expected, and a single server with
standard configuration can run several VM, providing service to several employees
Moreover, the VM software has the feature of saving a machine state instead
of turning it off, while releasing resources at the same time. This feature has two
benefits: it saves unused resources for other employees, and it provides a fast start
after the employee has disconnected and re-connects. Consequently, any scalability
test must not be performed on the total available employees that use RMS, but on
the concurrent number of employees.
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4.7.8 Latency
RMS is a real-time solution, as the employees expect a prompt response from the
corporate space. Just like every real-time solution, RMS is sensitive to the delay in
the connection between the VNC client and the VNC server. We define latency as
the time between the user’s input and the response obtained from the VNC client
application. This considers the processing delay at both ends, the propagation delay
over the links between the employee and the network, as well as the queuing delay
proper of communication networks.
According to Shneiderman [149], the response time for typing, cursor motion,
and mouse selection must be in the interval between 50 to 150 milliseconds. Conse-
quently, a real-time application that requires interactions from the user must meet
this requirement so that the user does not become frustrated with the application.
In general, the farther away the user is from the corporate resources, the bigger the
latency will be product of the propagation delay and the queuing delay. Additionally,
the more concurrent employees using the application, the more latency they will
experience product of the processing delay.
One solution that addresses this issue is to migrate RMS to the Cloud, such that
a distributed set of servers running the corporate spaces could be allocated close to
the employees. Furthermore, by implementing a group of servers, the number of
concurrent employees accessing a server will decrease, which will lead to a decrease
in the processing delay.
Additionally, the use of the Cloud could lead to other benefits such as redundancy
and higher availability of the resources that guarantees a continuous service to the
employee. Even if the entire datacenter becomes unavailable, another datacenter can
be used at the expense of a higher latency. Lastly we can mention the fact that Cloud
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solutions offer elastic computing by allocating resources on demand. For example, if
one server is running low on available resources, a back-up server can be enabled to
balance the load. In our experience, we have found that implementing VirtualBox on
top of a virtual machine in the Cloud is not straightforward. However, we were able
to run the virtualization software on one of Amazons EC2’s windows servers, albeit
with limited performance.
In section 4.8.3, we address the latency issue by providing results of experiments
for both a centralized solution and a distributed alternative.
4.8 Compatibility, Scalability and Latency
Experiments
In this section, we describe and show the results of experiments related to the chal-
lenges that RMS presents. The experiments are a compatibility test of productivity
applications found in Google Play for different implementations of Android for the
x86 architecture, a scalability test to determine how a server performance varies as
the number of concurrent users increases, and a series of latency evaluations in order
to describe the behavior of our framework in a large-scale deployment.
4.8.1 Compatibility
Google Play classifies the available applications different categories, being one of them
the productivity category. In order to determine the compatibility of RMS with the
applications, we tested a list of productivity applications suggested by Google Play.
This list included three paid applications, and did not include any mobile application
from Microsoft. As a consequence, we did not test the paid applications, but we did
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test four applications developed by Microsoft. Each of these mobile applications was
analyzed on a VM running AndroVM on a smartphone with Android 4.1, a second
VM running Android-x86 on a tablet with Android 4.4, and a third VM running
Genymotion on a tablet with Android 4.4. Tables A.1 and A.2 from Appendix A
show the list of the mobile applications that were tested, as well as a description of
each of them.
Our results indicate that for AndroVM 37 (90.2%) mobile applications can be
installed, and 33 (80.4%) work without issues. In the case of Android-x86, 40 (97.6%)
mobile applications can be installed, and 33 (80.4%) work without issues. Finally, for
Genymotion 37 (90.2%) mobile applications can be installed, and 35 (85.4%) work
without issues. Figure 4.6 shows a graphical representation of the results for this
experiment.
Figure 4.6: Results of compatibility experiment.
The applications that presented issues are “Papyrus - Natural notetaking” and
“TeamViewer for Remote Control”, which were installed in all the VMs, but they
did not work for AndroVM nor Android-x86; “Quip: Docs, Chat, Spreadsheets” was
installed in all VMs but it not work properly for any of the VMs; “Echo Notification
Lockscreen” and “Slack” were not found in Google Play for AndroVM and they were
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not installed nor run; the presentation feature of “WPS Office + PDF” did not work
for Android-x86; “Microsoft Office for Mobile” was not found in Google Play for each
of the VMs, and it was not installed nor run; “Microsoft OneNote” was not found in
Google Play for AndroVM and Genymotion, and it was installed in Android-x86 but
it did not run properly.
4.8.2 Scalability
One of the challenges of RMS is scalability, as one VM is needed for each BYOD
device. Our scalability tests consist on running our implementation of RMS in such a
way that we increase the number of concurrent VMs over the time, until the system
becomes unresponsive.
In order to provide context an MDM solution that supports up to 5000 users
requires three virtual machines [47]: an XM Device Manager with 2 to 4 virtual
CPUs, 4GB of RAM and 24GB of disk space, a Secure Mobile Gateway with 2 virtual
CPUs, 2GB of RAM and 24GB of disk space, and a XM SQL Server with 2 virtual
CPUs, 6GB of RAM and 24GB of disk space.
For our experiment, we worked with a high-performance server from Holland Com-
puting Center. The characteristics of the server include a AMD Opteron(TM) Proces-
sor 6272 with 64-cpu divided in 4 sockets of 8 cores each, with an x86_64 architecture
running at 2.16GHz; 256GB of DDR3 RAM in 32 modules of 8192MB each, running
at 1600 MHz; a Hitachi HUA72201 hard drive of 1TB, with a cached read speed of
3583.09 MB/sec and a buffered disk read speed 127.20 MB/sec. The OS of this server
was Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, with a 3.13.0-44-generic kernel. Additionally, the server did
not use any swap memory.
The implementation of RMS includes VirtualBox 4.3.20r96996, running AndroVM
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with 1024MB of RAM for each VM.
The statistics we used to evaluate our experiment are presented as follows:
• Memory consumption: how much memory the entire server is using. This pa-
rameter is obtained from command free.
• CPU usage: the percentage of CPU utilization of the entire server. This pa-
rameter is obtained from command top.
• Number of Threads: the amount of threads the server is running. This param-
eter is obtained from command ps.
• Load: average the load the system is experienced for the last 15 minutes. This
parameter is obtained from command top.
• Start Time: time between a command for starting a mobile OS is issued and
until the mobile OS answers a ping echo request. This parameter is obtained
as a post-process event.
• Restart Time: time between a re-start command is issued (for a paused VM)
and when the processing of such command ended. This parameter is obtained
as a post-process event.
Since the server is configured in such a way that it will always allocate new mem-
ory for new VM by killing other processes, the server generally kills a VM in order
to continue working. This means that we cannot obtain the maximum amount of
concurrent VMs based on the moment the server crashes. Consequently, we obtain
the limit of maximum concurrent mobile OS when the value of Start Time is greater
than 45 seconds, or when the value of Restart Time is greater than 25 seconds. An-
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other alternative is to set the limit when the number of threads decreases by a specific
number, which would indicate that the system killed a VM.
A script in BASH was developed in order to perform this experiment. The statis-
tics were measured by the script before the first VM was started and then after each
VM is started. The scripts used in this experiment are shown in Appendix B. We
have run this experiment four times. For each of the experiments, the system became
unresponsive at 599, 597, 594 and 596 VMs.
The behavior of memory usage is presented in Figure 4.7. Our results show that
when no mobile OS is running we have on average a memory consumption of 2.1GB.
Then, for each mobile OS, we add 0.67GB on average until we reach the total available
memory of 256GB. This limit is approximately around 380 mobile OS. After this
point, the memory consumption remains close to 256GB.
Figure 4.7: RAM usage as a function of the number of concurrent VMs.
The CPU usage presents a behavior shown in Figure 4.8. As expected, we can
see how the usage of the processor increases as the number of concurrent mobile
OSes increases, with spikes over 25%. In order to better describe the behavior of this
parameter, we used the fitting toolbox provided by Matlab to obtain a simple, linear
equation for the first run. The result is shown as follows:
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CPU = 20.35× 10−3N + 3.13 (4.1)
where CPU is the CPU usage and N is the number of concurrent VMs. Conse-
quently, we can observe that every new VM adds on average 0.02% to the total CPU
usage.
Figure 4.8: CPU usage as a function of the number of concurrent VMs.
For Load, we show its behavior in figure 4.9. As expected, we see that this
parameter increases as the number of concurrent VMs increase. The behavior of this
curve is polynomial and it can be approximated with the following equation:
Load = −5.03× 10−6N3 + 5.33× 10−3N2 + 251.39× 10−3N − 9.69 (4.2)
where Load is the average load of the system for the last 15 minutes and N is the
number of concurrent VMs.
We present the results of the number of threads as a function of the concurrent
number of VMs in Figure 4.10. The number of threads increases linearly, as it can be
shown in the following regression formula:
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Figure 4.9: Load of the system as a function of the number of concurrent VMs.
Threads = 20.05N + 764.05 (4.3)
where Threads is the number of threads in the system and N is the number of
concurrent VMs. Consequently, any new VM requires 20 threads.
Figure 4.10: Number of threads as a function of the number of concurrent VMs.
We present the results of our experiments for Start Time in Figure 4.11, which
shows how this time varies as the number of concurrent VMs increases. Further, we
can notice that there is a strong increment in the start time when the system reaches
the limit of concurrent VMs. We can represent the behavior of the Start Time using
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the following polynomial regression formula:
ST = −357.68× 10−9N3 − 243.91× 10−6N2 + 65.03× 10−3N + 5.79 (4.4)
where ST is the Start Time from power-off status and N is the number of con-
current VMs.
Figure 4.11: Start Time as a function of the number of concurrent VMs.
Finally, for Restart time, we show its behavior in Figure 4.12. The value of Restart
Time remains between 0 and 2 in most cases, but it presents a spike once the server
reaches the limit of supported VMs.
From these experiments we can see that the number of concurrent VMs depends
on the amount of available RAM. Consequently, we limited the amount of RAM in
the high-performance server to 128GB, 64GB, 32GB, 16GB, and 8GB. In each case,
the server presented a behavior consistent to the limit in the RAM. We repeated four
run for each of these cases and performed a regression in order to estimate the number
of concurrent VMs as a function of the available RAM. Such function is presented as
follows:
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Figure 4.12: Restart Time as a function of the number of concurrent VMs.
N = 2.31RAM + 4.70 (4.5)
where N is the number of concurrent VMs and RAM is the available RAM in the
system in GB. From this formula, we can see that each GB of RAM allows using 2.3
VMs. For completeness, we show in Figure 4.13 the representation of the data points
and the regression formula.
Figure 4.13: Number of concurrent VMs as a function of the available RAM.
From these series of experiments we can draw two conclusions. First, the amount
of RAM that a VM has allocated is not factor in determining of how many concurrent
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VMs we can support. The factor that determines limit for the number of VMs is the
amount of RAM that each VM consumes. Second, given the available RAM in the
server running the virtualization software, it results easy to estimate the maximum
number of concurrent VMs that the server can support, since this relationship is
linear.
4.8.3 Latency
RMS is delay-sensitive and a high level of latency impacts its usability. Consequently,
we analyzed how the system behaves in a scenario where the users are distributed
across the country and try to access their corporate spaces. We have designed a series
of experiments in order to measure the effect that the number of concurrent users and
the ping delay have over the overall application delay.
For these experiments we set up servers and clients in GENI [150], a distributed
testbed with several nodes across the country. The servers were configured with
our implementation of RMS using VirtualBox and AndroVM. The clients were using
vncdotool [151], a command line VNC client that can execute automated commands.
Each client was configured to send 12 clicks to the server and receive 12 screenshots
from the server.
In order to obtain the application delay, we capture VNC packets at each of the
clients. Then, we define the application delay as the time difference between a packet
with a click message has been sent from the client and a screenshot is completely
received by the client (including re-transmissions). Consequently, the application
delay presented in this section does not include the time needed for processing. In
order to set up these servers, we used the scripts shown in Appendix C.
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4.8.3.1 First scenario
The goal of our first experiment is to determine how the number of concurrent clients
affects the application delay. For our set up, we selected one client from the University
of Indiana and a server at Georgia Tech. We first measure the application delay when
there are no other clients, and then we added a second client for a different location
and run the experiment again to obtain the application delay in the Indiana node.
We continued this process by adding clients and measuring the application delay up
to 15 clients.
We define N as the number of concurrent clients that connect to a server and k as
the number of servers. Consequently, for this scenario we have N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 15}
and k = 1.
The list of clients we used and their locations are shown in Table 4.1. A graphical
representation of the location of the clients (in light blue), as well as the server (in
red) is presented in Figure 4.14. This figure also shows the order in which the clients
were added to the experiment.
Figure 4.14: Distribution and order of the clients across the country.
After the experiment is completed, we can represent and analyze how the appli-
cation delay behaves as a function of the number of concurrent clients. This behavior
is shown in figure 4.15. Further, we applied the fitting toolbox provided by Matlab
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Institution Location ID
Indiana University Bloomington, IN IU
Cloudlab Salt Lake City, UT CL
University of California, Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA UCLA
University of Kentucky Lexington, KY UKY
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA NPS
New York University New York, NY NYU
University of Wisconsin Madison, WI UW
Clemson University Clemson, SC CU
MAX Giga POP College Park, MD MAX
NYSERNET Syracuse, NY NYS
Kettering University Flint, MI KU
University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA UCB
University of California, Davis Davis, CA UBD
GPO Lab Boston, MA GPO
Florida International University Miami, FL FIU
Table 4.1: List of clients used in the first latency experiment.
and obtain a regression formula:
AppDelay = 4.19× 10−3N2 − 26.44× 10−3N + 742.34× 10−3 (4.6)
where AppDelay is the application delay in seconds at the Indiana University
client and N is the number of concurrent clients at the Georgia Tech server.
4.8.3.2 Second Scenario
In this case we evaluated the application delay of all clients listed in Table 4.1, for the
cases where there is only one client at the time and when all clients are accessing the
server at the same time. Consequently, in this case we have N = {1, 15} and k = 1.
Figure 4.16 shows the application delay for both situations, for each of the clients.
Additionally, based on the results of the application delay and the ping delay from
each client to the servers, we can estimate how the latter affects the former. This
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Figure 4.15: Application delay as a function of the number of concurrent clients, and
its regression curve.
Figure 4.16: Average of the application delay for each of the clients.
behavior is presented in Figure 4.17. The left graph of the figure is the application
delay as a function of the ping delay for single client. The right side, is the same
scenario but for 15 concurrent clients. Moreover, we can apply a regression process
and obtain formulas that describe the relationship between the application delay and
ping delay for single clients and multiple clients. We present such formulas as follows:
AppDelaySingleClient = 10.19× 10−3PingDelay + 383.78× 10−3 (4.7)
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AppDelayMultipleClients = 4.61× 10−3PingDelay + 1.08 (4.8)
where AppDelaySingleClient is the application delay in seconds for the single-client
case, AppDelayMultipleClient is the application delay in seconds for the multiple-clients
case, and PingDelay is the ping delay in milliseconds.
Figure 4.17: Application delay as a function of ping delay for single clients (N = 1)
and multiple clients (N = 15).
In this experiment we can see that the average application delay is 774.45 mil-
liseconds for individual clients and 1243.16 milliseconds for all the clients accessing
the server concurrently. The two figures are greater than the 150 milliseconds that is
expected in a real-time application. In the following sections, we show techniques to
decrease this application delay.
4.8.3.3 Third Scenario
For the third experiment we added two servers to the one we already had. Con-
sequently, the users now can select between three servers located at Georgia Tech,
Kettering University and UCLA. The clients use the ping delay to decide which server
to connect to. Table 4.2 provides the ping delay for each client to each server.
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Server
UCLA KU GA
Client
IU 66.40 16.57 28.22
CL 14.62 72.58 51.31
UCLA * 94.09 75.64
UKY 70.59 49.87 14.32
NPS 10.61 102.88 67.62
NYU 77.48 29.81 21.13
UW 77.32 41.87 37.90
CU * * *
MAX 71.90 24.56 26.32
NYS 82.21 34.85 25.86
KU 94.08 * 43.62
UCB 47.67 56.72 65.03
UCD 11.79 104.32 77.41
GPO 68.03 33.03 52.76
FIU 59.63 52.32 16.82
Table 4.2: Ping delay (in milliseconds) of each client to each server for the third
scenario. The shaded cell represents the smallest ping delay. An asterisk indicates
that the ping command did not received an echo reply.
Consequently, the server located in Georgia Tech provides services to CU, FIU,
NYU, NYS, UKY, and UW; the server in Kettering University is accessed by the
clients in IU, GPO, and MAX; the server located in UCLA provides access to CL,
NPS, UCB, and UCD. In this case we will have NGA = {1, 6} for the server located at
Georgia Tech, NKU = {1, 3} for the server located at Kettering University, NUCLA =
{1, 4} for the server located at UCLA, and k = 3. Figure 4.18 shows the topology of
the network. It has to be noted that in this case, Kettering University and UCLA
cannot be clients and servers at the same time due to limitations in GENI’s networking
configuration. As a consequence, these locations were not used as clients.
After running the experiment, we observe that the application delay is reduced
on average by 19.34% (from 774.45 to 624.69 milliseconds) for the case where there
is only one client, and that the application delay for multiple clients is reduced on
average by 44.09% (from 1243.16 to 695.07 milliseconds).
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Figure 4.18: Distribution of the clients across the country.
We must remark that the fact that the Kettering Client and the UCLA client are
not present in this network also contributes to decrease the application delay, as there
are less concurrent clients per server. However, this effect is not significant, as the
number of concurrent clients is small. For the case of the Kettering Universiy server,
N is 3 instead of 4, and for the case of the UCLA server N is 4 instead of 5. Figure
4.19 shows the results the experiments.
Figure 4.19: Average of the application delay for each of the clients for single server
and multiple servers.
Finally, we can analyze how the application delay behaves as a function of the
ping delay for each of the servers and for either single users or multiple users. For
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the clients that connect to the Kettering University server, we have the following
equations for application delay as a function of ping delay, for both single clients and
three concurrent clients.
AppDelaySingleClient = 7.32× 10−3PingDelay + 455.50× 10−3 (4.9)
AppDelay3Clients = 16.80× 10−3PingDelay + 287.23× 10−3 (4.10)
Figure 4.20 provides a graphical representation of the behavior of the application
delay as a function of the ping delay, for both single clients (left side of the graph)
and three concurrent clients (right side of the graph).
Figure 4.20: Application delay as a function of ping delay for single clients and
multiple clients, for Kettering University server.
We repeat the same analysis for the rest of the servers. We compare how the
application delay behaves as a function of the ping delay for both, a single client at
the time and all the available clients for such server. The results of this analysis show
that for the UCLA server, we have the following regression formulas:
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AppDelaySingleClient = 81.36× 10−6PingDelay + 611.58× 10−3 (4.11)
AppDelay4Clients = 430.88× 10−6PingDelay + 620.64× 10−3 (4.12)
These results can be represented as a graph that includes the obtained valued and
a linear regression based on these values. Figure 4.21 shows the results for a single
client (left side of the graph) and for the four concurrent clients (right side of the
graph).
Figure 4.21: Application delay as a function of ping delay for single clients and
multiple clients, for UCLA server.
Finally, we perform the same analysis for the server in Georgia Tech. First we
obtain the application delay as a function of the ping delay for single clients and then
for six concurrent clients. Then, we obtain the following regression equations:
AppDelaySingleClient = 3.49× 10−3PingDelay + 565.05× 10−3 (4.13)
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AppDelay6Clients = 4.64× 10−3PingDelay + 616.76× 10−3 (4.14)
Consequently, we represent such behavior in Figure 4.22, where the left side of the
graph shows the results of the experiment and the regression analysis for single clients
and the right side of the graph shows the same information but for six concurrent
clients.
Figure 4.22: Application delay as a function of ping delay for single clients and
multiple clients, for Georgia Tech server.
From this third experiment and its results we claim that the application delay not
only depends on the ping delay from each client to the server, but also on the number
of concurrent clients that connect to the server. First, by making the clients connect
to servers that have a lower ping delay, the application delay decreases. Second, if
multiple clients connect simultaneously to the same server, we see that the application
delay increases compared to the case where the clients access the same server without
any other client accessing the server at the same time.
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4.8.3.4 Fourth Scenario
In the third scenario we showed how the application delay can be decreased when the
clients connect to the server that has the minimum ping delay. However, this might
lead to situations where one server has many concurrent clients, while the rest of the
servers present only a few. Under this condition, the average application delay will
be negatively impacted.
In this scenario we propose an algorithm that deals with this situation. The main
goal behind this algorithm is to equalize the number of concurrent clients in the
servers, in order to minimize the average application delay. Such algorithm, which is
presented in Algorithm 1, is individually performed by each client.
Data: δ and ServerList
Result: ServerName
1 Obtain PingDelay and N from each server;
2 Obtain minPingDelay and corresponding Position in PingDelay;
3 foreach i in SeverList do
4 if (minPingDelay + δ) > PingDelayi and Ni < NPosition then
5 Position = i;
6 end
7 end
8 ServerName = ServerListPosition;
Algorithm 1: Proposed algorithm to reduce application delay.
The main concept behind this algorithm is simple: after obtaining the ping delay
to each server, pool the servers for the number of concurrent clients (represented
as N), then find the minimum ping delay, and connect to the server that has the
smallest N and whose ping delay is smaller than a threshold. This threshold is set
by the minimum ping delay plus a parameter δ set by the administrators.
This algorithm presents a time complexity of O(ck), where c is a constant and k is
the number of servers. Further, this algorithm is decentralized as each client runs it
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Institution Location ID
Indiana University Bloomington, IN IU
Cloudlab Salt Lake City, UT CL
University of Kentucky Lexington, KY UKY
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA NPS
New York University New York, NY NYU
University of Wisconsin Madison, WI UW
Clemson University Clemson, SC CU
MAX Giga POP College Park, MD MAX
NYSERNET Syracuse, NY NYS
University of California, Davis Davis, CA UBD
GPO Lab Boston, MA GPO
Florida International University Miami, FL FIU
Cornell University Ithaca, NY COR
University of Chicago Chicago, IL CHI
Stanford University Stanford, CA SU
Table 4.3: List of clients used in the fourth latency experiment.
independently. Additionally, we point out that in the case where δ = 0, the algorithm
behaves as if the clients were in the third scenario and only connect to the server with
the minimum the ping delay, regardless of the number of concurrent clients.
Based on this algorithm we set up a new experiment in GENI. This time, with
15 clients (n = 15) and 3 servers (k = 3). In this case, we used the same servers
located in Georgia Tech, UCLA and Kettering University, but we used a different list
of clients. This list is presented in Table 4.3. Additionally, we present the ping delay
from each client to each server in Table 4.4
Before running the experiment in GENI, we obtained the ping delay for each client
to each of the servers. Then, we executed the algorithm for different values of δ for
each of the clients. In order to do that, we run the algorithm for the first client, then
for the second client and so on. Finally, after the algorithm is run for the last client,
we obtain a connection matrix that indicates the server where each client connects
to. For our case, we have different configurations for δ = {0, 2, 4, 24}.
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Server
UCLA KU GA
Client
IU 66.2 19.92 80.48
CL 14.48 67.46 108.60
UKY 70.56 44.66 14.60
NPS 10.58 97.92 67.36
NYU 77.12 24.50 23.84
UW 77.16 53.66 91.60
CU 61.04 35.20 74.11
MAX 71.86 19.50 26.14
NYS 82.12 29.60 26.08
UCD 11.64 99.24 104.00
GPO 84.96 35.62 34.16
FIU 60.06 47.10 16.74
COR 83.96 31.56 27.68
CHI 60.18 47.6736.24 46.76
SU 79.91 97.32 102.00
Table 4.4: Ping delay (in milliseconds) of each client to each server for the fourth
scenario. The shaded cell represents the minimum ping delay.
Based on these values of δ, we run the different configurations in GENI, and
we obtain the application delay for each client. The results of this experiment are
presented in Figure 4.23. In this figure, the minimum application delay is found for
the case of δ = 2. This application delay is 719.42 milliseconds, and it is 5.3% smaller
than then one obtained for δ = 0 (which is 759.33 milliseconds). Further, in this
figure we included the number of concurrent clients that connects each of the servers.
However the arrival order of the clients conditions the results of this experiment.
In order to consider this situation, we obtained an heuristic formula that outputs
similar results (within a 5% margin) than the results obtained from GENI. This
formula is presented as follows:
AppDelayi = 10
−3(0.083PingDelay3i,j − 55PingDelayi,j − 100 + 18.1N2j − 60Nj)
(4.15)
108
Figure 4.23: Average of the application delay for different values of δ.
where AppDelayi is the corresponding application delay for each client (i), the
variable PingDelayi,j is the ping delay for each client (i) and each server (j), and Nj
is the number of concurrent clients for each server (j).
Using Matlab we simulated the experiment for the same 15 clients, considering
10,000 random arrivals, and obtained the average of the application delay for δ =
{2, 4, 6, . . . , 26}. We present the code that generated this simulation in Appendix C.
Further, we were interested in comparing the results of our heuristic algorithm
with the optimal solution that minimizes the average application delay. In order to
do that, we formulated a model for OPL/CPLEX, which is presented in Model 4.1. In
this model, n is the number of clients, k is the number of servers, and cc is a Boolean
matrix of n rows and k columns that represent the connectivity of the clients to the
servers. Consequently, this model presents n× k variables and n constraints.
Model 4.1 is an optimization problem formulation that consists of values of cc that
minimize the average application delay, with the condition that a client can connect
only to one server. For a brute force approach, the time complexity of this problem is
O(kn) as we need to consider all the possible combinations. Moreover, to achieve the
optimal solution, we need to know the ping delays from each client before running
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Variables: cci,j ∈ 0, 1
Parameters: n, k, P ingDelayi,j
Function: minimize 10−3
n
∑n
i=1((0.083PingDelay
3
i,j − 55PingDelayi,j − 100 +
18.1N2j − 60Nj)× cci,j)
Constraints: for all i in 1..n
∑k
j=1 cci,j = 1
Model 4.1: OPL/CPLEX Model.
Number of clients
15 45 75 120 150
OPL/CPLEX 0.69496 5.01110 10.85877 27.34117 43.87045
M
at
la
b
(δ
)
0 0.75462 5.04814 16.36965 28.09692 56.58935
2 0.71462 5.07378 11.33197 27.42543 46.02089
4,6 0.72892 5.08750 11.19599 27.44796 45.93721
8,10 0.73611 5.07150 11.20110 27.42034 45.94170
12,14,. . . ,20 0.77104 5.19954 11.23941 27.49544 45.99091
22 0.73611 5.07156 11.20111 27.42039 45.94172
24 0.77104 5.19954 11.23941 27.49544 45.99091
26 1.55639 6.43857 11.21816 27.91556 44.19000
Table 4.5: Average application delay in seconds provided by the OPL/CPLEX and
the Matlab simulations. The shaded cells indicate the smallest application delay
obtained from the Matlab Simulation.
the model. The code used for this implementation in OPL/CPLEX is presented in
Appendix C.
Finally, we considered the cases where there are more than 15 clients and simulated
scenarios for 45, 75, 120 and 150 clients and 3 servers. In order to obtain this numbers
of clients, we randomly selected them from the original list of 15, obtaining the
corresponding ping delay matrix for each of the cases. Consequently, we simulated
these scenarios in both Matlab and OPL/CPLEX. Given the high number of possible
combinations, we run our OPL/CPLEX model for 8 hours in the case of 45 and 75
users, and 12 hours in the case of 120 and 150 users, and report the best solution
obtained so far. We present our results in Table 4.5.
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Based on the results obtained from Table 4.5, we can compare the results of our
proposed algorithm and the solution found by OPL/CPLEX. We conclude that the
best solution that our algorithm can find (considering all the values of δ) is at most
3.11% bigger than the optimal solution found by OPL/CPLEX.
The application delay results we obtained are greater than the 150 milliseconds
limit. However, we can decrease the application delay by changing the encoding of the
images the server sends to the client. In our experiments we have used raw encoding
because of compatibility limitations in the client software. However, a comparison
with other VNC clients shows that the application delay can be reduced up to a 80.0%
by using hextile encoding, which decreases the size of the data to be transmitted from
the server to the client. The implementation of this encoding would reduce the latency
on average to 124.94 milliseconds for individual users and to 139.01 milliseconds for 13
concurrent users, in the case of the third scenario. For the fourth scenario, the average
application delay for 15 concurrent clients would be reduced to 142.95 milliseconds if
we apply our algorithm. Further, there are other encoding techniques, such as VNC
Tight Encoder, that claim even better encoding performance [152].
In this chapter, we described and analyzed in detail the performance of RMS.
We described an implementation and showed experimental results related to this
implementation. In the next chapter, we will provide our conclusion and future
research directions related to RMS.
111
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter presents the conclusion of this thesis and directions for future research.
5.1 Conclusions
The introduction of BYOD policies are beneficial for both the enterprise and its
employees, as it increases job satisfaction, the employees become more productive,
the enterprise can use it to recruit potential employees, while it reduces costs related
to assets and operation.
However, BYOD policies and the mobility nature of BYOD devices pose security
threats to the enterprise information, as well as the employee privacy. This creates the
challenges of data leakage, unauthorized sharing of spaces, lack of security compliance,
and employee privacy.
In order to address these challenges, a secure BYOD environment must meet the
goals of space isolation, corporate data protection, security policy enforcement, true
space isolation, non-intrusiveness, and low resource consumption.
A classification of the current solutions for BYOD has been presented. We can
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categorize the solutions into Mobile Virtual Machine, Agent-based, Cloud-based, Vir-
tual Private Network, Trusted Environments, and Framework. We summarize which
goals they meet, and we show that currently there is no solution that achieves all of
these goals.
In this thesis we proposed a new framework for a secure BYOD environment,
Remote Mobile Screen (RMS), which meets all the necessary goals for a secure BYOD
environment. Our framework mainly consists on deploying a personal space on the
mobile device, and deploying a corporate space at the corporate network. Then, the
employee accesses his or her corporate space through the use of a VNC client.
We describe the architecture of RMS, described how it works, discussed its fea-
tures, and showed an example of an implementation using commonly available soft-
ware. Further, we provide a security analysis on our architecture, and discussed the
challenges related to RMS. We have showed results of our experiments related to
compatibility, scalability and latency.
In our compatibility experiment, we showed that at least 90.2% of the produc-
tivity applications found in Google Play can be installed in mobile OSes for the x86
architecture, and that 80.4% of the applications work on these mobile OSes.
In our scalability experiment, we tested our implementation on a high performance
server provided by HCC. In this experiment, we showed that up to 596 VMs can be
run in such server. We concluded that the RAM requested by the VM is not a factor
in determining of how many concurrent VMs we can support. Further, by limiting
the RAM available, we observed that the number of VMs is linearly related to the
amount of available RAM, where 2.3 VMs can be run for each GB of available RAM.
Finally, in our latency experiment we showed that the application latency experi-
enced in a particular client increases as a function of the number of concurrent clients
accessing a server, and the ping delay from the client to the server. Further we showed
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how the application delay can be decreased below an acceptable value of 150 millisec-
onds by deploying multiple servers close to the clients and by using high-compression
encoding formats in the VNC protocol.
5.2 Directions for Future Work
We present a series of directions for future research. We would like to develop a
Corporate Space Manager. This implementation must consider the centralized and
distributed scenarios that different enterprises may present. We plan to improve
our implementation of RMS by including all the components that were not used in
our proof-of-concept. Another research directions involve the possibility of having
multiple users in a single implementation of Android, in order to increase the scal-
ability performance. Further, we would like to explore the implementation of iOS
on virtual machines, either for x86 or ARM architectures. Future work also includes
developing algorithms and solutions for content distribution in distributed networks
where users modify the content. Since the VNC protocol might not be suitable for
mobile applications, a new communication protocol could be developed. This proto-
col must consider the gestures and features proper of mobile devices, as well as the
requirements for a secure communication. Further, the introduction of a new commu-
nication protocol will include developing client and server applications for different
mobile platforms. Other research direction involves implementing other techniques
for reducing the latency in the VNC protocol. Finally, we plan to perform usability
surveys that consider the feedback from real users.
The introduction of BYOD policies, which allow employees to use their personal
mobile devices, create serious security challenges for both the enterprise and the
employees. These challenges must not be ignored by the enterprises and proper
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solutions must be implemented in order to protect both the corporate data as well as
the personal data.
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Appendix A
List and Description of Mobile
Applications Tested in the Usability
Experiment
Below we present a set of tables that contain the name of the mobile application used
in the experiment in section 4.7.3, as well as a short description of the type of each
application. Given the number of applications tested, we show the information in two
tables.
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Table A.1: List of mobile applications analyzed.
Application Description
Advanced Task Manager - Boost Task Manager
ai.type keyboard Plus + Emoji Keyboard
Application Description
AirDroid - Android on Computer Remote Notification
AntiVirus Security - FREE Antivirus
Basecamp - Official App Project Management
Cisco WebEx Meetings Web Conference
Cloud Print Printing
ColorNote Notepad Notes Note Taking
Dropbox Cloud Storage
Easy Uninstaller App Uninstall Uninstaller
Echo Notification Lockscreen UI Enhancer
Evernote Note Taking
EverythingMe Launcher UI Enhancer
Flipboard: Your News Magazine News Reader
Gmail Email
Google Docs Word Processor
Google Drive Cloud Storage
Google Keep - notes and lists Note Taking
Google Sheets Spreadsheets
Google Slides Presentations
Google Text-to-Speech UI Enhancer
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Table A.2: List of mobile applications analyzed (contd.).
Application Description
IF by IFTTT Automation
Link Bubble Browser Web Browser
Application Description
Mailbox Email
Microsoft Office for Mobile Productivy Suite
Microsoft OneDrive Cloud Storage
Microsoft OneNote Note Taking
Microsoft Outlook Preview Email
Papyrus - Natural notetaking Note Taking
Pocket News Reader
Quip: Docs, Chat, Spreadsheets Productivy Suite
Skitch - Snap. Mark up. Send. Note Taking
Slack Communication
Splashtop Remote Desktop HD Remote Access
Stitcher Radio for Podcast Manager Podscast
Sunrise Calendar Callendar
SwiftKey Keyboard + Emoji Keyboard
TeamViewer for Remote Control Remote Access
Todoist: To-Do List, Task List To-Do List
WPS Office + PDF Productivy Suite
Wunderlist: To-Do List & Tasks To-Do List
118
Appendix B
Scripts Used in the Scalability Test
Below we show the scripts used to perform the experiments related to the scalability
test presented in section 4.8.2.
Listing B.1: run_experiment.sh
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 # This scripts turns the VM in a server and obtains statistics.
4
5 # We that the arguments of the command are correct. The name of an
output file is needed.
6 if [ "$#" -ne 1 ]; then
7 echo "Usage" $0 "OUTPUT -FILE"
8 exit
9 fi
10
11 # We define a function that obtains the desired statistics.
12 function getstats {
13 MEMORY=‘free -t -m | grep "Mem :\| cache :\| Swap :\| Total" | awk ’{
mem=mem","$3} END {print mem}’‘
14 CPU=‘top -b -n2 | grep "Cpu(s)"|tail -n 1 | awk ’{print $2 + $4
}’‘
15 THREADS=‘ps -eo nlwp | tail -n +2 | awk ’{ num_threads += $1 }
END { print num_threads }’‘
16 LOAD=‘top -b -n1 | grep "load" | awk ’{print $11 $12 $13}’‘
17 echo $MEMORY","$CPU","$THREADS","$LOAD
18 }
19
20 # We start the expriment , obtain the first statistics and record
them in an output file.
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21 echo "Starting Experiment" >> $1
22 date "+%D %T.%N" >> $1
23 getstats >> $1
24 echo >> $1
25
26 # The for loop used to issue the commands a pre -defined number of
times.
27 for i in ‘seq 1 768‘;
28 do
29 # We obtain information about the VM.
30 HOST=‘VBoxManage guestproperty enumerate androVM_$i | grep
androvm_ip_management | awk ’{ print substr($4 , 0, length(
$4))}’‘
31 VM="androVM_"$i
32 START=‘date "+%T.%N"‘
33 COUNTER =0
34 UNREACHABLE =1
35
36 # We start the VM.
37 VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless
38
39 # Repeat this while the VM is still booting.
40 while [ "$COUNTER" -lt 180 -a "$UNREACHABLE" -ne 0 ] ; do
41
42 # If the host has not an IP assigned yet , wait a second.
43 if [[ $HOST == *"10.10.0.100"* ]] ; then
44 sleep 1;
45 HOST=‘VBoxManage guestproperty enumerate androVM_$i |
grep androvm_ip_management | awk ’{ print substr($4 ,
0, length($4))}’‘
46
47 # Else , ping the VM.
48 else
49 ping -q -c1 -w 1 $HOST && UNREACHABLE=$?
50 fi
51
52 # Count the number of times we tried to reach the VM.
53 COUNTER=$(( COUNTER + 1))
54 done
55
56 # If the VM is unreachable , print a message and exit the script
.
57 if [ "$UNREACHABLE" -ne 0 ] ; then
58 echo "$HOST is unreachable"
59 exit
60
61 # Else , record stats of the VM, stop it and restart it.
62 else
63 REACHED=‘date "+%T.%N"‘
64 STATS=‘getstats ‘
65 VBoxManage controlvm $VM savestate
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66 PAUSED=‘date "+%T.%N"‘
67 VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless
68 RESTARTED=‘date "+%T.%N"‘
69 echo $VM","$HOST$STATS","$START","$REACHED","$PAUSED","
$RESTARTED >> $1
70 fi
71 done
72
73 # Finally , record final messages in the output file.
74 echo >> $1
75 echo "Experiment finished" >> $1
76 date "+%D %T.%N" >> $1
77 getstats >> $1
Listing B.2: stop_experiment.sh
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 # This script stops all the VMs.
4 # The for loop is used to execute the programs a pre -defined
number of times.
5 for i in ‘seq 1 512‘;
6 do
7 echo "Powering off androVM_"$i
8
9 # Stop VM in VirtualBox
10 VBoxManage controlvm androVM_$i poweroff
11
12 # If there is an error in the previous command , there are no
VMs to stop , and we exit the script.
13 if [ $? -eq 1 ]
14 then
15 sleep 10
16 ps -aux | grep VBox
17 exit
18 fi
19
20 # Obtain the list of VMs still running and kill them
21 PROCESSES=‘ps -aux | grep VBoxHeadless | awk ’{PID=PID" "$2}
END {print PID}’‘
22 kill -9 $PROCESSES
23 done
Listing B.3: create_vms.sh
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 # This scripts creates virtual machines in VirtualBox based on an
OVA file.
4 # The for loop used to issue the command a pre -defined number of
times.
5
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6 for i in ‘seq 1 768‘;
7 do
8 VBoxManage import ./ androVM_benchmark.ova --vsys 0 --vmname
androVM_$i
9 done
Listing B.4: delete_vms.sh
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 # This scripts deletes virtual machines in VirtualBox based on the
VM name.
4 # The for loop used to issue the command a pre -defined number of
times.
5
6 for i in ‘seq 1 768‘;
7 do
8 VBoxManage unregistervm androVM_$i --delete
9 done
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Appendix C
Scripts Used in the Latency Test
Below we show the scripts used to perform the experiments related to the latency
test presented in section 4.8.3.
Listing C.1: client_fedora_script.sh
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 # This script installs all the needed software for setting up a
client running Fedora in GENI.
4
5 # Install modify the repositories , install python -pip , PIL and
vncdotool.
6 sudo sed -i ’s/https/http/g’ /etc/yum.repos.d/fedora -updates.repo;
sudo sed -i ’s/https/http/g’ /etc/yum.repos.d/fedora.repo;
sudo yum -y install python -pip; sudo pip -python install PIL;
sudo pip -python install vncdotool
7
8 # Obtain the ping delay to each server and record them in output
files.
9 ping -c 5 143.215.216.146 >> ping_GA.txt;
10 ping -c 5 164.67.126.19 >> ping_UCLA.txt;
11 ping -c 5 192.245.254.18 >> ping_KET.txt
12
13 # Obtain the route to each server and record them in output files.
14 traceroute 143.215.216.146 >> traceroute_GA.txt
15 traceroute 164.67.126.19 >> traceroute_UCLA.txt
16 traceroute 192.245.254.18 >> traceroute_KET.txt
Listing C.2: client_ubuntu_script.sh
1 #!/bin/bash
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2
3 # This script installs all the needed software for setting up a
client running Ubuntu in GENI.
4
5 # Install modify the repositories , install python -pip , PIL and
vncdotool.
6 sudo apt -get update; sudo apt -get -y install python -dev python -pip
; sudo pip install --allow -unverified PIL vncdotool
7
8 # Obtain the ping delay to each server and record them in output
files.
9 ping -c 5 143.215.216.146 >> ping_GA.txt
10 ping -c 5 164.67.126.19 >> ping_UCLA.txt
11 ping -c 5 192.245.254.18 >> ping_KET.txt
12
13 # Obtain the route to each server and record them in output files.
14 traceroute 143.215.216.146 >> traceroute_GA.txt
15 traceroute 164.67.126.19 >> traceroute_UCLA.txt
16 traceroute 192.245.254.18 >> traceroute_KET.txt
Listing C.3: server_script.sh
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 # This script installs all the needed software for setting up a
server running Ubuntu in GENI.
4
5 # Mount an additional hard drive to have extra storage for the VMs
.
6 /usr/testbed/bin/mkextrafs /mnt
7
8 # Configure the repositories and install VirtualBox 4.3
9 echo "deb http :// download.virtualbox.org/virtualbox/debian precise
contrib" | sudo tee -a /etc/apt/sources.list
10 wget -q http :// download.virtualbox.org/virtualbox/debian/
oracle_vbox.asc -O- | sudo apt -key add -
11 sudo apt -get update
12 sudo apt -get install virtualbox -4.3
13
14 # Configure the repositories and install adb.
15 sudo add -apt -repository ppa:nilarimogard/webupd8
16 sudo apt -get update
17 sudo apt -get install android -tools -adb
18
19 # For loop to create a predefined number of VMs (provided as the
first argument).
20 for i in ‘seq 1 $1 ‘;
21 do
22
23 # Import a VM in VirtualBox using an OVA file. We need to
provide the path to the mounted hard drive.
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24 VBoxManage import ./ androVM.ova --vsys 0 --vmname androVM_$i --
vsys 0 --unit 10 --disk /mnt/androVM_$i/androVM -disk1.vmdk
--unit 11 --disk /mnt/androVM_$i/androVM -disk2.vmdk --unit
12 --disk /mnt/androVM_$i/androVM -disk3.vmdk
25 done
26
27 # Create a hostonly interface. This is used by AndroVM for
management.
28 VBoxManage hostonlyif create
29
30 # Create a NAT network with a DHCP
31 VBoxManage natnetwork add --netname "NatNetwork" --network
10.0.2.0/24 --enable --dhcp on
32
33 # For loop to create a predefined number of por -forwarding rules (
provided as the first argument).
34 for i in ‘seq 1 $1 ‘;
35 do
36
37 # For each VM, add a forwarding rule.
38 VBoxManage natnetwork modify --netname NatNetwork --port -
forward -4 "guestvnc$i:tcp :[143.215.216.146]:5090 $i :[10.0.2.
$(i+3) ]:5901"
39 done
Listing C.4: model.m
1 % This Matlab Scripts simulates how a GENI implementation behaves
2 % based on the heuristic we proposed. It randomly selects n users
3 % from a set of 15 users , it randomly decides 10,000 arrival
orders ,
4 % and obtains the average application delayfor each oder , for
5 % different values of delta. The output file includes each of
these
6 % average application delays and the ping delay matrix for the n
7 % clients selected.
8
9 % Clear the variables and the console.
10 clear
11 clc
12
13 % Select the name of the output file.
14 fileID = fopen(’exp.txt’,’w’);
15
16 % Parameters.
17 delta =0:2:26;
18 n=150;
19 k=3;
20
21 % Original ping delay for the 15 clients in GENI.
22 orig_pingdelay = [
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23 66.2 19.92 80.48
24 14.48 67.46 108.6
25 70.56 44.66 14.6
26 10.58 97.92 67.36
27 77.12 24.5 23.84
28 77.16 53.66 91.6
29 61.04 35.2 4.112
30 71.86 19.5 26.14
31 82.12 29.6 26.08
32 11.64 99.24 104
33 84.96 35.62 34.16
34 60.06 47.1 16.74
35 83.96 31.56 27.68
36 60.18 36.24 46.76
37 9.916 97.32 102
38 ];
39
40 % Create ping delay matrix for n clients and k servers and
41 % randomly select the clients from the original matrix.
42 pingdelay=zeros(n,k);
43
44 for i=1:n
45 pingdelay(i,:)=orig_pingdelay(randi (15) ,:);
46 end
47
48 % In case we only consider the 15 original clients from GENI.
49 % pingdelay=orig_pingdelay;
50
51 % Repeat 10.000 times.
52 for l=1:10000
53
54 % Obtain the size of delta and create the arrival matrix.
55 [dn dk]=size(delta);
56 arrival=randperm(n);
57
58 % Loop for each of the elements in delta
59 for m=1:dk
60
61 % Create the connectivity matrix and the vector that
62 % contains the number of concurrent clients for each
server.
63 cc=zeros(n,k);
64 N=zeros(k,1);
65
66 % Loop for each of the n clients.
67 for i=1:n
68
69 % Obtain the minimum delay and its position in the
70 % matrix.
71 [minimum ,pos]=min(pingdelay(arrival(i) ,:));
72
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73 % Check if any ping delay satisfies the conditions in
74 % the algorithm.
75 for j=1:k
76 if (( minimum + delta(m)) > pingdelay(arrival(i),j)
&& (N(j)<N(pos)));
77 pos=j;
78 end
79 end
80
81 % Update the cc matrix and the N vector.
82 cc(arrival(i),pos)=1;
83 N(pos)=N(pos)+1;
84 end
85
86 % Initialize the vector for computing the application
87 % delay
88 appdelay=zeros (15 ,1);
89
90 % For each of the cells in cc
91 for i=1:n
92 for j=1:k
93
94 % If the cell is equal to 1, compute the
95 % application delay for the client i.
96 if cc(i,j) == 1
97 appdelay(i)=10^( -3) *(0.083* pingdelay(i,j)
^3-...
98 55* pingdelay(i,j) -...
99 100+18.1*N(j)^2 -60*N(j));
100 end
101 end
102 end
103
104 % Print the results fot this of this run in the output
105 % file
106 formatSpec = ’n= %d delta= %d and meandelay= %f\n’;
107 fprintf(fileID ,formatSpec ,n,delta(m),mean(appdelay));
108 end
109 end
110
111 % Print the ping delay matrix in the output file , so it can be
112 % used in OPL/CPLEX
113 fprintf(fileID ,’PingDelay = [ \n’);
114 for i=1:n
115 fprintf(fileID ,’[%.2f %.2f %.2f],\n’,pingdelay(i,:));
116 end
117 fprintf(fileID ,’\n];’);
Listing C.5: model1.mod
1 /* ********************************************
127
2 * OPL 12.6.0.0 Model
3 * Author: santiago
4 * Creation Date: Mar 24, 2015 at 3:45:30 PM
5 ******************************************** */
6
7 using CP;
8
9 execute {
10 cp.param.timeLimit =3600;
11 cp.param.OptimalityTolerance =1E-2;
12 cp.param.RelativeOptimalityTolerance =1E-1;
13 }
14
15
16 //... Arguments
17 int n = 15;
18 int k = 3;
19 float PingDelay [1..n][1..k] = ...;
20
21 //... Variables
22 dvar boolean cc[1..n][1..k];
23
24 //... Additional variables
25 range r=1..n;
26
27 //... Function
28 minimize (10^( -3)/n) * (
29 sum(i in 1..n, j in 1..k) (
30 0.083 * PingDelay[i][j]^3 -
31 55 * PingDelay[i][j] -
32 100 +
33 18.1 * (sum(r in 1..n)cc[r][j])^2 -
34 60 * (sum(r in 1..n)cc[r][j])
35 ) * cc[i][j]
36 );
37
38 //... Constraints
39 subject to{
40
41 forall(i in 1..n, j in 1..k){
42 sum(c in 1..k) cc[i][c] == 1;
43 }
44 }
45
46 //... Store the CC Matrix in an Output File
47 execute {
48 var ofile = new IloOplOutputFile("Output.txt");
49 ofile.writeln("cc = [");
50 for (var i in thisOplModel.r){
51 ofile.writeln(thisOplModel.cc [1][1]+" "+thisOplModel.cc[i
][2]+" "+thisOplModel.cc[i][3])
128
52 }
53 ofile.writeln("]");
54 ofile.close();
55 }
129
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